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AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE
SYMPOSIUM: THINKING
CREATIVELY ABOUT REMEDIES
How High Do Cartels Raise Prices?
Implications for Optimal Cartel Fines
John M. Connor'
Robert H. Landet
This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing
Guidelines are set at the appropnate levels to deter cartels optimally. The authors analyze two
data sets to detennine how high on average cartels raise pnces. The first consists of every
published scholarly economic study ofthe eikcts ofcartels on prices in individual cases. The
second consists ofevery final verdict in a us. antitrust case in which a neutral fmder ofmct
repoI1ed collusive overcharges. They repoI1 average overcharges of 49% and 31 % fOr the two
data se~ and median overcharges of 25% and 22%. They also repoI1 separate results fOr
domestJc cartels, intemational cartels, more recent cartels, and bid-n"gging. The authors
conclude that the current Sentencing Commission presumption that cartels overcharge on
average by 10% is much too low. If this finding is correct, the principles ofoptimal deterrence
imply that the current levels ofcartelpenalties should be increased significantly.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

How high do cartels raise prices? Do cartels often or typically
raise prices a significant amount for a significant period? Or, as some
suggest, are their anti competitive effects ephemeral because most
cartels, established out of misguided optimism by naive
businesspeople, collapse so quickly that meaningful statistics about
how high they raise prices cannot even be computed? In light of the
answers to these questions, are the current United States Sentencing
Commission (Commission) cartel penalties-which are based upon a
presumption that cartels raise prices by 10o/o--set at the right levels?
Was the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of
2004--which raised the maximum cartel fine from $10 million to
$100 million-wise legislation?l Given our desire optimally to deter
anticompetitive behavior and to permit desirable behavior, should the
current antitrust penalties for different types of collusion cases be
changed?
Despite the importance and the fundamental nature of these
questions, this Article represents the first systematic and
comprehensive attempt to study them. This Article will assemble and
analyze the relevant empirical, economic, and legal evidence, using
two very different sources of data.
The first set of evidence consists of every serious, scholarly
social-science study of the effects of naked collusion in individual
cases we have been able to find. 2 With very few exceptions,3 we
I.
Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-237, § 215,118 Stat. 665, 668 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § I).
2.
The list of case studies we found and used can be found in John M. Connor,
Price-Fixing Overcharges: LegaJ and Economic Evidence 75-97 (Am. Antitrust Inst.,
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attempted to report on every scholarly study that contained quantitative
information on the price effects of private cartels.4 We separately
analyzed domestic and international cartels of different types from
different time periods to determine whether the increased penalties of
recent years have been having significant effects.
Our second data source was obtained by examining every final
verdict in United States collusion cases that we were able to find. 5 We
searched for antitrust cases in which a neutral finder of fad reported
collusive overcharges in percentage terms or presented conclusions
that could be converted into an overcharge percentage.?
This Article will analyze these two sets of evidence using the
standard optimal deterrence framework. s This process will help
determine whether the current United States Sentencing Gwdelines for
cartels have been set at the appropriate level to deter antitrust
violations optimally.
This examination is especially timely in light of the effects of the
recent Supreme Court decision in Um·ted States v. Booker on the
Sentencing Gwdelines. 9 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens held
Working Paper No. 04-05, 2004), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org!recent2/
355.pdf. Portions of this Article draw upon and are taken directly from this working paper.
We would be grateful to any readers who can point out case studies that we inadvertently
omitted. For our inclusion methodology, see infia Part IV
3.
A small percentage was excluded due to poor quality. See John M. Connor,
Appendix Tables fOr Price-Fixing Overcharges: Legal and Economic Evidence (Purdue U.
Agric. Econ., Staff Paper No. 04-17, 2005), available at http://www.agecon.purdue.edul
staff/connor/papersIPRICE_FIXING_OVERCHARGES_APPENDIX_TABLES_8-05.pdf.
These tables provide the basis for the conclusions presented both in this Article and Connor,
supra note 2.
4.
In the vast majority of studies, the scholars themselves provided the overcharge
calculations, although in a few cases we derived the results from the presented material. For a
formal definition of the measured overcharges, see infia note 104 and accompanying text.
5.
The list of the final antitrust verdicts that we found is in the Appendix. As
discussed inffa Part V, we attempted to find and include every final verdict in a U.S. cartel
case. We would be grateful to any readers who can bring to our attention any verdict we
inadvertently omitted.
6.
We did not include settlements because parties sometimes settle for amounts that
are unrelated to the actual overcharge involved or, in some cases, to whether the cartel at issue
actually succeeded in raising prices. Nor did we include allegations made by government or
private plaintiffs, or statements by defendants, because they often are subjective.
7.
We made no attempt to critique or second-guess these judge or jury determinations.
8.
For an explanation of the standard optimal deterrence framework, see infia Part
II. This Article will not discuss whether the antitrust laws are exclusively concerned with
deterrence or whether they are also concerned with compensation of victims.
9.
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). A jury found the defendant guilty of possessing 92.5
grams of crack, a crime for which the statute authorized a minimum sentence of ten years and
a maximum of life imprisonment, and for which the Sentencing GUldelines required the
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that juries, not judges, must determine beyond a reasonable doubt
every contested fact that might increase a defendant's punishment. IO A
separate opinion, by Justice Breyer, concluded that the Sentencing
Guidelines were advisory instead of mandatory." Although the effects
of Booker on antitrust penalties are complex and difficult to predict,12
under any plausible scenario the questions addressed by this Article are
timely and of increasing importance.
To analyze this topic, this Article will first show how the current
system of antitrust penalties was formulated. It will then demonstrate
how optimal penalties for collusion should be related to the amount by
which cartels are presumed to increase prices. This is the framework
surrounding and the reasons underlying this Article's examination of
how high cartels typically raise prices.
II.

OPTIMAL DETERRENCE AND THE

10% PRESUMPTION

The generally accepted approach to deterring antitrust violations
optimally was developed by Professor William Landes. 13 He
convincingly showed that to achieve optimal'4 deterrence's the damages
from an antitrust violation should be equal to the violation's expected
"net harm to others"'6 divided by the probability of detection and proof
judge to select a base sentence between 210 and 262 months. Id at 746 (Stevens, 1.,
delivering the opinion of the Court in part). In a sentencing hearing, however, the judge
determined by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker possessed an additional 566
grams of crack and was guilty of obstructing justice. Id Therefore, the Guidelines required
the judge to increase the sentence to between 360 months and life imprisonment. Id The
judge sentenced Booker to 30 years. Id A similar scenario occurred in the companion case,
United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 738,747 (2005).
10. The Court found that a judge may sentence a defendant based only on the '''facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.'" Id at 749 (quoting Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004».
II.
See id at 764 (Breyer, 1., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
12.
See inffa notes 236-249 and accompanying text.
13. William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L.
REv. 652, 656 (1983). Landes built upon and applied to antitrust a framework developed in
Gary S. Becker, Cnine and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 761. POL. ECON. 169
(1968).
14. The quest is not complete deterrence because enforcement aggressive enough to
deter all cartels is likely to penalize honest business conduct.
15. Professor Landes was not concerned with the compensation of victims. For an
analysis that takes compensation into account, see Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble"
Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.1. 115,161-68 (1993).
16. The logic underlying the "net harm to others" standard was explained clearly by
Professors Breit and Elzinga:
The trick to discovering the optimal sanction is to fmd a rule that will force
the potential cartelist to compare any cost saving from his activity with the
deadweight loss triangle. If the cost saving were larger than the deadweight loss, it
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of the violation. 17 Analysts of both the Chicago and post-Chicago
schools of antitrust have almost universally accepted these principles. 18
The "net harm to others" from cartels of course includes the
overcharges they cause/ 9 but also includes other, less obvious factors.
First, market power produces allocative inefficiency-the deadweight
loss welfare triangle. 20 Although allocative inefficiency often is
significant empirically,21 it apparently has never been awarded in an
antitrust case.22 Second, market power can produce "umbrella
effects,"23 another factor that can, in part, constitute a "net harm to
would be in his (and society's) interest to undertake the illegal activity. So after he
deducts the monopoly profit rectangle ... the cartelist will examine the deadweight
loss (the remainder of the fme to be paid) and compare it with the value of the cost
saving. The fme that is the sum of the deadweight triangle plus the profit rectangle
is the correct sanction since it will encourage the "right" amount of illegal antitrust
activity. Damages larger than this ... could lead to over-deterrence ....
A numerical example may help to clarify the concept of the optimal antitrust
sanction. Assume that a potential cartelist calculates that joining a horizontal
price-fixing conspiracy will increase his profits by $100 million. He also is aware
that the deadweight loss imposed on society by his activity is $50 million. If the
expected value of the fine imposed is the entire amount of consumers' surplus
($150 million) would he enter the cartel? He would do so if he believed that the
cartel would be accompanied by cost reductions to him greater than $50 million. If
the cost saving were, say, $60 million, he would still enter the price-fixing
conspiracy because he would know that his fme would be $100 million (his cartel
profits) plus $50 million (the deadweight loss) leaving him $10 million more
revenue than would be the case if he did not enter the cartel. In this case the cartel
is accompanied by cost reductions greater than the deadweight loss it imposes on
society. On efficiency grounds, it should be permitted.
WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 11-12 (1986).
17. See Landes, supra note 13, at 666-68. Thus, if the harm were ten and the
probability of detection and proof were .33, since 10/.33 = 33, the optimal penalty for this
violation would be 33. This ignores risk aversion and other factors. See id
18. See Lande, supra note 15, at 161-68. For this Article's purposes, however, the
precise optimal deterrence standard used is not crucial. Similar results would arise if this
article instead used a "gross harm to others" or a "net gain to the offenders" standard.
19. See Landes, supra note 13, at 656.
20. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 277-92
(4th ed. 1982) (defining allocative inefficiency and providing proof that it is created by
monopoly pricing); MICHAEL L. KATZ & HARVEY S. ROSEN, MICROECONOMICS 114 (3d ed.
1998).
21. See Frank Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON. 445, 455
(1985). Judge Easterbrook made a number of standard assumptions and calculated that, due
to the omission from damage awards of this factor alone, '''treble' damages really are [only]
double the starting point of overcharge plus allocative loss." /d
22. See David C. Hjelmfelt & Channing D. Strother, Jr., Antitrust Damages for
Consumer We/fare Loss, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 505, 505 (1991).
23.
"Umbrella effects" is the name given to higher prices charged by nonviolating
members that were permitted or caused by the violation's supracompetitive prices. PHILLIP E.
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others" from anticompetitive conduct that is never or virtually never
awarded. 24 Moreover, there are several additional types of hanns that
often are caused by cartels,25 and cartel members sometimes have less26
incentive to innovate or to offer as wide an array of nonprice variety or
quality options. 27 Finally, all of a cartel's hanns should be adjusted to
present value. 28 When the adjustments that are at least somewhat
quantifiable are combined, the results show that the "net hann to
others" from a cartel typically is significantly more than the cartel's
overcharges. 29
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 384-85 (Supp. 1992); William H. Page,
The Scope ofLiabIlity for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1445, 1465-67 (1985). To
illustrate, OPEC never produced even 70% of the free world's supply of oil. See MOHAMMED
E. AHRARI, OPEC: THE FAILING GIANT 203 (1986). Yet, when OPEC raised prices, noncartel
members also increased oil prices. See OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin 20 (2004),
available at http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%BulletinlpdflASB2004.pdf
(last visited Jan. 18,2005). Moreover, the price of fuels that were partial substitutes for oil,
such as natural gas, also rose. See, e.g., Stephen P.A. Brown, Natural Gas Pricing: Do Oil
Pn'ces Still Matter?, SOUTHWEST ECON. 4 (Fed. Res. Bank of Dallas July/Aug. 2005),
available at http://www.dallasfed.orgiresearch/swe/2005/swe0504c.html; Mine K. Yucel &
Shengyi Guo, Fuel Taxes and Cointegration of Energy Prices, CONTEMP. ECON. POLICY 12,
33-41 (1994). Relationships between oil prices and other fuels (e.g., coal and uranium) are
more difficult to establish.
24. Umbrella effects of collusion cause allocative inefficiency, an additional "net
harm to others." They also result in a wealth transfer from consumers to firms not
participating in the cartel. This transfer would not count under a "net harm to others"
standard. See Landes, supra note 13, at 666-68. Landes's decision to omit these transfer
effects from his optimal deterrence formulation has been insightfully and thoughtfully
criticized. See Page, supra note 23, at 1490. Moreover, Landes noted that it might
sometimes be appropriate to count these transfers:
Although the net benefit rule is perfectly general, the conclusion that the cartel
should not be liable for any overcharges on units sold by the competitive fringe
holds only under the cost conditions [described earlier]. If the fringe's marginal
cost were to exceed the previous competitive price, then their rents or benefits
would be less than the harm to consumers on the units purchased from the fringe.
In the limit, if the fringe's marginal cost were constant and equal to the cartel price,
optimal damages would equal ... the entire overcharge plus the deadweight loss.
Landes, supra note 13, at 668. In addition, this transfer should be counted if one believes that
a purpose of the antitrust laws is to compensate victims.
25. The omitted factors include: (I) uncompensated plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and
costs, (2) the uncompensated value of plaintiffs time spent pursuing the case, and (3) the costs
of the judicial system. See Lande, supra note 15, at 129-58.
26. Alternatively, one could argue that cartel members will have more funds to use
for socially desirable innovation. We know of no evidence, however, that this effect is
significant empirically.
27.
See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Implementing the "Consumer Choice"
Approach to Antitrust Law, ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2006) (on file with author).
28.
Studies suggest that the average cartel probably lasts seven to eight years, with an
additional four-plus-year lag between filing of suit and judgment. See Lande, supra note 15,
at 130-34.
29. For the underlying calculations, see id at 158-60.
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Moreover, since not every cartel is detected or successfully
proven, the "net harm to others" from cartels should be multiplied by a
number that is larger than one (the multiplier should be the inverse of
the probability of detection and proOt).30 Of course, no one knows the
percentage of cartels that are detected and proven. In 1986, the
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Douglas Ginsburg (AAG
Ginsburg), estimated that the enforcers detected no more than 10% of
31
all cartels. There are reasons to believe that the Antitrust Division's
amnesty program has resulted in a larger percentage of cartels detected
and proven today,32 but there is anecdotal evidence that, despite the
enforcers' superb efforts, many cartels still operate. 33 From an optimal

30.
"Multiplication is essential to create optimal incentives for would-be violators
when unlawful acts are not certain to be prosecuted successfully. Indeed, some multiplication
is necessary even when most of the liability-creating acts are open and notorious. The
defendants may be able to conceal facts that are essential to liability." See Easterbrook, supra
note 21, at 454.

31. See Sentencing Options: Heanng BelOre the United States Sentencing
Commission (July 15, 1986), in UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION: UNPUBLISHED
PUBLIC HEARINGS 1986, at 15 (1988) [hereinafter Sentencing Heannlfj.
32. See Gary R. Spratling, Detection and Deterrence: Rewarding lnfonnants lOr
Reporting Violations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REy. 798, 817-23 (2001).
33. The continued high number of Department of Justice (DOl) grand juries, and the
recent DOJ success rate in the courts, is evidence that many cartels still exist. As of February
2004, the DOJ had approximately 100 pending grand jury investigations, 50 of which
involved suspected international cartel activity. ANTITRUST DIY., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
STATUS REpORT: AN OvERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION'S
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM I (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/202531.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2005) [hereinafter STATUS REpORT). Between
1994 and 2003, the DOJ opened from thirty-three to sixty-three grand jury investigations per
year, most of which resulted in convictions. ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
WORKLOAD STATISTICS: FY 1994-2003, at 4, 7 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
publicl12848.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2006). The following table, extracted from this data,
shows the DOJ's success in prosecuting antitrust violations:
Total
Criminal
Cases
Filed
Won
Lost
Pending
Appeal
Decisions

'94

'95

'96

'97

'98

'99

2000

'01

'02

'03

57
51
4

60
65
2

42
38
5

38
40
I

-

-

-

57
48
2
24

63
52

-

62
64
I
17

35

44
38
2
39

33
37
I
34

41
32
I
42

9

7

6

4

6

-

-

5

I

2

-

During the last four years more than "80 years of imprisonment have been imposed on
antitrust offenders, with more than 30 defendants receiving jail sentences of one year or
longer." STATUS REpORT, supra, at 3. In 2002, defendants in cases prosecuted by the Antitrust
Division "were sentenced to a record number of jail days, more than 10,000 in all." ld In
2003, the average jail sentence reached a record high of twenty-one months. Id at I. [fthere
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deterrence perspective it would be necessary to know the percentage of
cartels that are detected and proven to know what number to multiply
the "net harms to others" by. 34 At a minimum, however, we know that
if the combined antitrust sanctions only total the actual damages, firms
would be significantly undeterred from committing antitrust
violations.
Ideally, optimal deterrence should be based upon the expectations
of potential price fixers, not the results of their price-fixing or the
actual fmes imposed. 35 To ascertain this, however, we would have to
interview a random sample of potential price fixers and discern their
expectations. 36 In reality, however, it would be impossible to assemble
a proper random sample or to get them to respond candidly.37 So our

had been little or no effective price-fixing during this period, the DO] fooled a lot of grand
juries, judges, and juries.
34. Instead of attempting to ascertain the actual probability of detection and
conviction, an alternative approach would be to focus upon the perceptions of probable
defendants. It would be extremely useful to know potential price fixers' perceptions of the
probability that they will be caught and convicted of price-fIXing, and their belief as to how
much they will be forced to pay. We know of no reliable information on this issue, however.
35. Their expectations will, to some degree, be informed by their discussions with
their antitrust lawyers, but there still could well be systematic differences between their
expectations and reality. In addition, potential price fixers might well be risk seekers, and
have other relevant psychological traits on the average.
Specifically, there could be a difference between how much potential price flxers think
they would be likely to earn from price-fixing, and the amount a court or economist measures
after the fact. Similarly, there could be a difference between reality and their estimate, at the
time of the price-fIXing, of the probability they will get caught and convicted, and their
expectation as to how much the negotiated fine will be.
36. A different way to frame the optimal deterrence issue is in terms of whether
cartels usually know in advance of litigation roughly how much they will be found to have
overcharged. Can most firms that are members of cartels predict in advance of litigation, for
example, that a court will find that it overcharged 5%, as opposed to 15%? Another issue is
how risk-seeking or averse they are, in light of the probability that lengthy, protracted
litigation could result in an uncertain result.
37. In addition, optimal deterrence theory is based on the balance between the
present value of expected future corporate profits from the conduct and the present value of
expected future monetary sanctions. If the firm is a proprietorship, considering only
company rewards and punishment makes eminent sense, but if there is a separation between
ownership and management, then the personal motives of managers will be pertinent in
evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions. The simpler versions of optimal deterrence theory
assume that there are no principal-agent divergences and that the managers are risk-neutral.
In fact, it is generally the case that the reward structures of executive compensation contracts
typically give short-term personal enrichment a greater weight in executive decisions than the
long-run interests of stockholders. If the profits generated by price-fIXing generate personal
rewards for such managers, then the optimal ratio of sanctions to illegal profits must be
higher than for a proprietorship. Similarly, a higher ratio will be required if managers are
risk-loving in their corporate decision making rather than risk-averse. For these reasons, our
focus on corporate-level performance in the present paper is at best a rather imperfect
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substitute for the expectation questions is to attempt to determine how
high price fixers actually have raised prices in the past, and then to
assume that this is a close proxy for their expectations of how high
they will be able to raise prices at the time of the price-fixing.38
An additional factor must, moreover, be considered whenever a
cartel is international in scope. Fines calculated under the US.
antitrust laws are likely to consider only purchases made by buyers in
the United States. 39 If a significant percentage of the cartel's sales are
outside the United States, a penalty calculated solely upon Unites
States sales will result in significant underdeterrence.
While US. fines are supplemented by fines secured by foreign
antitrust enforcers, these penalties tend to be significantly lower than
United States fines, and private damage suits are virtually unknown
outside the United States.40 Although many of the world's antitrust
agencies have increased their sanctions against international cartels
significantly during the last decade,41 we believe that the current level
of foreign antitrust penalties are only a small fraction of those needed
to reduce cartel recidivism to optimal levels. This is true for several
reasons.
First, as noted, these fines tend to be smaller than US. fines for
42 Second, even these relatively low foreign
comparable situations.
fmes were virtually always imposed on sales in either Western Europe
43
or Canada. Cartel violations in Asia, Africa, and South America have
gone virtually unpunished. 44 Third, all the leading antitrust agencies
surrogate for stockholder control, managerial risk aversion, and other factors that we would
like to incorporate.
38. For this reason, we acknowledge that we are administering an imperfect test using
a surrogate for what we really would like to measure.
39. See F. Hoffinann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 167-69 (2004).
40. For a comparison of antitrust fines by the United States, Canada, and the
European Union against a variety of international cartels, see JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL
PRICE-FIXING: OUR CUSTOMERS ARE THE ENEMY 339-4 I 1 (200 I).
4 I. John M. Connor, Global Antitrust Prosecutions ofModem Intemational Cartels,
41. INDUSTRY, COMPETITION, & TRADE 239 (2004).
42. For a comparison of United States, EU, and Canadian filles against a large sample
of international cartels, see id EU fines for identical cartels averaged 72% of U.S. fine
levels, and Canada's 6% of the U.S. average Id at 263.
43. U.S., EU, and Canadian fines accounted for 79% of all corporate monetary
sanctions imposed on international cartels during 1990-2003. Of the remaining fines, nearly
all were imposed by national antitrust authorities within the EU. See Connor, supra note 41,
at 255-62.
44. Australia, Mexico, Korea, Taiwan, and Japan have fined international cartels.
However, these nations overwhelmingly concentrate their enforcement resources on local
price-fIXing violations. John M. Connor, Private Intemational Cartels: Efkctiveness,
Welfare, and Anticarte/ EnfbrcementtbI. 18 (Dep't of Agricultural Econ., Purdue Univ., Staff
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tend to offer large monetary concessions to carte lists that agree to
plead guilty, fail to oppose administrative proceedings, offer
incriminating information about their fellow conspirators, or cooperate
in other ways with prosecutors.45 These widespread corporate leniency
programs have beneficial aspects to be sure, but they also exacerbate
the tendency of governments to offer steep fine discounts to guilty
parties.46 And, of course, we are skeptical that more than a small
fraction of international price-fixing currently is discovered.
In the United States deterrence against cartels is supplied by a
combination of factors: private treble damages actions, jail sentences
for some categories of violations, and criminal fines for some types of
antitrust violations. 47 This Article only will focus on the last of these
types of sanctions, criminal fines. We will not attempt to ascertain
whether these other types of sanctions should be adjusted.
The current48 criminal fines for cartels are established by
Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the Commission.49 The
Guidelines provide that the base fine level generally will be "20% of
Paper No. 03-12, 2003), http://agecon.lib.umn.edulcgi-binlpdCview.pl?paperid=11506&
ftype=.pdf. Moreover, their ability to fine large international cartels is constrained by low
absolute fine limits or by low maximum percentages (e.g., 6% in Japan) of local affected
sales. Stuart M. Chemtob, Special Counsel for Int'I Trade, Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice,
Antitrust Deterrence in the United States and Japan, Address Before the Conference on
Competition Policy in the Global Trading System 9 (June 23, 2000), aVaIlable at
www.usdoj.gov.
45. On average, corporations received 86% discounts from the base fme levels from
1974-1980. See Mark A. Cohen & David T. Scheffman, The Andtrust Sentencing Guideline:
Is the Punishment Worth the Costs?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 331, 342 (1989). More recently,
there is ample evidence that the DOJ has typically negotiated large discounts from the
maximum fines specified by the Sentencing Guidelines. For example, the government settled
for fines that were typically 75% to 85% below the maximum possible in the lysine, citric
acid, and vitamins cartels. See CONNOR, supra note 40, at 360-73. Similar, but smaller,
discounts were awarded by the European Commission in the same cases. Id at 399-409. In
the vitamins case, the second through fifth firms to plead guilty were granted average
downward departures of about 80% from the Guide/ines maximum fmes. As a result of U.S.
sentencing practices, its criminal fmes amounted to less than II % of the vitamins cartel's
global monopoly profits. Brief Amicus CudaeofProfessors Darren Bush et al. in Support of
Respondents at *16-17, F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004)
(No. 03-724), available at2004 WL 533933 (internal citation omitted).
46. The U.S. corporate leniency policy gives automatic amnesty (a 100% fine waiver)
to the first company (and its officers) that apply and meet certain conditions. See Connor,
supra note 2, at 11.
47. Brief Amicus CunaeofProfessors Darren Bush et aI., supra note 45, at *15-16.
48. The Guidelines originally provided that "[t]he fine range for an organization is
from 20 to 50 percent of the volume of commerce, but not less than $100,000." FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK § 2R 1.1 (c) (Wayne Barr et al. eds., 1990).
49.
UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Rl.l (2005) [hereinafter
USSG MANUAL].
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the volume of affected commerce".50 The Commission's cartel fine
levels, established in 1987 and in effect today, follow from its famous
presumption: "It is estimated that the average gain from price-fixing is
10 percent of the selling price.,,51
The Commission explained how it used this estimate to establish
cartel fines. After noting that fines should be based on consideration
of both the gain to the offender and the losses caused by the offender,
the Commission noted that it would double the 10% estimate to
account for harms "inflicted upon consumers who are unable or for
other reasons do not buy the product at the higher prices.,,52 The
Commission added: "The purpose for specifying a percent of the
volume of commerce is to avoid the time and expense that would be
required for the court to determine the actual gain or loss.,,53
Although the preceding explanation does not completely clarify
why the Gwdelines doubled the assumed 10% loss, the explanation in
the Gwdelines' commentary implies that the doubling could be due to
such factors as the allocative inefficiency harms of market power, the
disruptive effects on victims, the lack of prejudgment interest caused
by antitrust violations,54 and/or the umbrella effects of market power.55
Consideration of these factors would more than justify doubling the
10% figure to account for the "net harm to others" from cartels. 56
Moreover, the doubling can perhaps be explained by the Criminal
Fine Improvements Act of 1987, which provides an alternative fine:
"If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the
offense results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant,
the defendant may be fined not more than the greater of twice the

50. /d § 2Rl.l(d)(1).
51.
/d § 2Rl.l, application n.3.
52. The full quotation reads:
The loss from price-fixing exceeds the gain because, among other things, injury is
inflicted upon consumers who are unable or for other reasons do not buy the
product at the higher prices. Because the loss from price-fixing exceeds the gain,
subsection (d)(I) provides that 20 percent of the volume of affected commerce is to
be used in lieu of the pecuniary loss under § 8C2.4(a)(3).
/d
53. /d
54. This should include the value of corporate time and disruption caused by private
suits to recover damages from cartels.
55. It is clear, however, that the Commission's decision to double the 10% presumed
overcharge does not account for the small chances of fmding and convicting cartels or the
lack of prejudgment interest. There is no reason to believe that in 1988 the Antitrust Division
uncovered and convicted 50% of cartels.
56. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
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gross gain or twice the gross loss ...."57 Perhaps the 20% figure in
§ 2R1.1 is a "proxy" for this "twice the gain or loss" provision in the
Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987.
Regardless of the precise reason for this doubling, the start with a
base fine of double the 10% presumed overcharge and use this in
conjunction with the assigned base offense level (of 10) for antitrust
offenses. 58 They adjust this offense level by a number of factors, such
as whether bid-rigging59 and other aggravating factors were involved,
and by mitigating factors as well.60 A complex series of adjustments
result in a pair of "culpability multipliers" that are somewhere between
.75 and 4.0. The product of the base fine (20% of the affected
commerce) and the culpability multipliers (the pair of numbers
between .75 and 4.0) results in the fme range that is to be imposed on a
cartel member. (These fines usually are adjusted downward for
cooperation or as a part of the Division's leniency program.61) As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted, the
Commission "opted for greater administrative convenience" instead of
undertaking a specific inquiry into the actual loss in each case.62
Since the 10% figure is so crucial to the Commission's cartel fine
Gwaeiines, it certainly is worth asking where this figure came from,
and what support was provided for this estimate. The record suggests
that the Commission adopted the 10% presumption because its use
was advocated by the (then) head of the Antitrust Division, Douglas

57.
Pub. L. No. 100-185, § 6, 101 Stat. 1279, 1280 (codified at 18 U.S.c. § 3571(d)
(2000)).
58. USSG MANuAL, supmnote 49, § 2R1.1.
59.
If bid-rigging is involved, the base offense level is increased by 1. /d
§ 2Rl.l(b)(I). This indicates the Commission's belief that bid-rigging is worse than other
forms of illegal collusion.
60.
/d § 2Rl.l & application n.l.
61.
See Spratling, supm note 32, at 816-17. The Commission's Commentary also
notes, "[i]n cases in which the actual monopoly overcharge appears to be either substantially
more or substantially less than 10 percent," the Commission might not employ the 20%
assumption. USSG MANuAL, supm note 49, § 2Rl.l, application n.3. But in practice,
prosecutors almost always use the figure of 20% of affected commerce as their starting point
in their criminal fine calculations. See Spratling, supm note 32, at 816.
62. United States v. Hayter Oil Co., 51 F.3d 1265, 1276 (6th Cir. 1995). The court
noted: "'The offense levels are not based directly on the damage caused or profit made by
the defendant because damages are difficult and time consuming to establish. The volume of
commerce is an acceptable and more readily measurable substitute.'" /d at 1274 (quoting
U.S.S.G. § 2Rl.l). The court later stated, "We fmd nothing other than the following
commentary language that indicates that the Sentencing Commission adopted the theory of
optimal penalties: 'It is estimated that the avemge additionalprofit attributable to price fixing
is 10 percent of the selling price.'" /d at 1276 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2Rl.l).
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Ginsburg. 63 In a statement to the Commission, AAG Ginsburg
explained that the standard optimal deterrence model means that "[t]he
optimal crime [fine] for any given act [of price-fixing is] equal to the
damage caused by the violation divided by the probability of
convictions .... [S]uch a fine would result in a socially optimal level
of price fixing, which is in this case zero.',(j4 He also stated his
judgment that "price fixing typically results in price increases, that has
[sic] harmed the consumers in a range of 10 percent of the price," and
that these violations had no more than 10% chance of detection. 65
This, in turn, raises the question of how AAG Ginsburg arrived at
his 10% overcharge estimate. While we do not know all of the reasons
behind his conclusion,66 a prominent analysis of this issue by Cohen
and Scheffman published shortly after the antitrust Sentencing
Guidelines were promulgated sheds some light on this subject.67 They
state that the economic evaluation of a (very small) number of pricefixing conspiracies was particularly important in shaping the 1986-87
conclusions of Ginsburg and the Commission that the overcharges
from price-fixing conspiracies were approximately 10%.68 Cohen and
Scheffman included evaluations of United States v. Container Corp. of
Americd9 and the subsequent civil litigation,7o the Federal Trade
Commission case involving the bakers of Washington state,71 and a
short survey by DOJ economists of empirical studies of bid-rigging in
the road-building industry in the 1980s.72 Thus, the lynchpin of
modern criminal fines-the Commission's simplifying assumption
63.
64.
65.

Sentencing Hearing, supra note 31, at 13-15.
Id
Id at 15. If Justice Ginsburg was correct, damages for cartels should have been

tenfold.
66. Interestingly, two economists at the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice published an unusually thoughtful analysis of many of these issues at roughly the
same time that AAG Ginsburg testified before the Commission. See generally Gregory 1.
Werden & Marilyn 1. Simon, U1Jy Price Fixers Should Go to Prison, 32 ANTITRUST BULL.
917 (1987). Included in this article was a tantalizingly brief survey of existing cases, and on
this basis they concluded that a "conservative estimate of the average price increase from
price-fixing is 10 percent." Id at 924-25. Even though the article's first note cautions that all
of the views in the article "are not purported to reflect those of the U.S. Department of
Justice," one cannot help but note that this is the same estimate that AAG Ginsburg provided
to the Commission. Id at 917.
67. See generaliyCohen & Scheffman, supra note 45.
68. See id at 344-45.
69. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
70. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 80 F.R.D. 244 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
71. In re Bakers of Washington, Inc., 64 ET.C. 1079 (1964).
72. Cohen & Scheffman, supra note 45, at 344-45 (for results of this survey, see
Werden & Simon, supra note 66, at 925).
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that cartels raise prices by 10%-is supported by a surprisingly small
amount of evidence.
III. Is THE 10% PRESUMPTION VALID: PRlORANALYSESOFTHE
EVIDENCE

The Commission's 10% presumption was attacked as unreliable
and excessive soon after it was issued. For example, Cohen and
Scheffinan's 1989 critique concluded, "there is little credible statistical
evidence that would justify the Commission's assumptions which
underlie the Antitrust Guideline.,,73 They also concluded "[a]t least in
price-fixing cases involving a substantial volume of commerce, ten
percent is almost certainly too high.,,74 Moreover, the specific data that
the Commission used was attacked as unreliable because, allegedly,
"later research has cast considerable doubt on ... these estimates,
concluding that the markups, if they existed, were quite small.,,75
During recent years, this criticism has been repeated with more
frequency and intensity. These attacks could be due to rising levels of
criminal antitrust fines in recent years. Starting after 1990 "a series of
record corporate fines were imposed for criminal price-fixing by u.s.
COurtS."76 Not surprisingly, attorneys who have defended companies
accused of collusion in highly publicized international antitrust
conspiracies have claimed that the 10% presumption has led to
penalties so large they have resulted in overdeterrence. For example,
just as the DOl's campaign against international cartels was gathering
steam, Adler and Laing concluded that "[t]he fines being imposed
against corporate members of international cartels are staggering," and
placed the blame on the ''uniquely punitive" requirements of the
United States Sentencing Gwaelines. 77
After viewing an
intensification of this trend for another two years, Adler and Laing
were even more alarmed. 78 More recently, Michael L. Denger, a
73. Cohen & Scheffinan, supra note 45, at 333.
74.
Id at 343.
75. Id at 345.
76. Connor, supra note 2, at 9. No new records have been made since 1999. "A
similar upswing may be noted for fmes imposed by the European Commission from 1995 to
2001." Id
77. Howard Adler, Jr. & David 1. Laing, The Explosion of Intemational Cdminai
Antitrust EnfOrcement, Bus. CRIMES BULL., Mar. 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS-NEXIS
Academic Universe.
78. "What is ... troubling is that the company fines ... have risen astronomicallyto levels far higher than the fines for other serious economic crimes and in amounts that can
be unrelated to the economic harm caused by the violations." Howard Adler, Jr. & David 1.
Laing, As Corporate Fines Skyrocket Antitrust Offenders: Time To Revisit Treatment by
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former Chair of the ABA Antitrust Section, denounced the price-fixing
fine levels because they "lack ... an empirical foundation.,,79 He
places the blame for excessive fines on the Corporate Gwaeline's use
of 20% of the volume of affected commerce. 80 This approach, he
notes, presumes a pecuniary loss of 10% of sales due to price-fixing;
unlike all other white collar federal crimes, the actual degree of direct
harm caused does not have to be proven by prosecutors. 81
Concerns about the excessiveness of antitrust sanctions are part
of the larger issue of the effectiveness of antitrust interventions. In a
provocative artic1e82 that quickly drew vigorous rebuttals,83 Crandall
Sentencing Guidelines, Bus. CRIMES BULL., Apr. 1999, at 1, avaIlable in LEXlS-NEXlS
Academic Universe. In 1997, DOJ fines for antitrust were at least seven times higher per
case on average than fines levied for corporate fraud, money laundering, or racketeering. Id
The authors depend on the multiple of seven to make their case; no evidence is presented as
to the relative harm of these white-collar crimes in 1997 or any other year. Id The authors
also assert that availability of the "double the harm" standard for fmes in the 1994 alternative
fme provisions, see 18 U.S.c. § 3S71(d) (2000), empowers prosecutors to intimidate many
corporate defendants into acceding to excessively high fines as part of their guilty pleas. See
id
79. Michael L. Denger, Former Chair, ABA Antitrust Section, A New Approach to
Cartel Enforcement Remedies Is Needed, Remarks at the ABA Section of Antitrust Law
Spring Meeting, Chair's Program (Apr. 24-26, 2002). The ABA Section of Antitrust Law has
recently offered a similar critique.
The Section has questioned, and continues to question, whether the current
presumption in determining criminal fme levels is empirically sound or good
public policy. Having reviewed the Sentencing Commission's analysis of the issue,
the Section concluded that the presumption that the "average gain from pricefixing is 10 percent of the selling price" was unsupported by empirical economic
evidence.
Comments of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law in Response to the Antitrust Modernization
Commission's Request for Public Comment on Criminal Remedies (Nov. S, 200S), available
http://www.abanet.org!antitrustlcommentsI200SI1I-0S/criminal-remedies-comm.pdf.
at
Similarly, Tefft W Smith called for lowering the 10% presumption down "to 3 or S%. That
may be (equally) arbitrary but probably more realistic, 'fair' and desirable from an
enforcement policy perspective." Comments for the Antitrust Modernization Commission
Hearing on Criminal Antitrust Remedies (Nov. 3, 200S), http://www.amc.gov/commission_
hearings/pdflSmith_Statement.pdf.
80. Id at 3-4.
81. Denger primarily uses an increase in settlement rates in treble-damage directpurchaser suits to establish the alleged unfairness of the high fines imposed on corporate
price fixers, an increase that, he believes, cannot be explained by increases in overcharge rates
or other factors. Id He cites about eight domestic U.S. law cases that he reports as settling
for 2% to 4% of sales in the 1970s and one international case in 2001 that settled for 18% to
20%.Id
82. Robert W Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve
Consumer Welfare? Assessing the EVIdence, 171. ECON. PERSPECTNES 3 (2003).
83. Professor Kwoka faults them for their "startlingly selective" body of evidence.
See John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Attack on Antitrust Policy and Consumer Welfare: A Response
to Crandall and Winston (Dep't of Econ., Northeastern Univ., Working Paper No. 03-008,
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and Winston argued that extant empirical evidence demonstrates that
antitrust policy has been ineffective in either raising consumer welfare
or in deterring anticompetitive conduct: "We fmd little empirical
evidence that past [antitrust] interventions have provided much direct
benefit to consumers or significantly deterred anticompetitive
behavior.,,84
To support their view that cartels are ineffective and the
prosecution of overt price-fixing is unwise, they cited five empirical
studies of overt collusion which found that conspiracies convicted in
U.S. courts have no upward effects on prices.85 While Crandall and
Winston later admitted that there are some "examples" of successful
collusion, they cite no studies that support cartels' positive effect on
prices.86
2003), available at http://www.economics.neu.edullibrary/research/03-008.pdf. He suggests
that they should have included serious studies with appropriate evaluation of their credibility.
See id. at 4; see also Jonathan Baker, The Case for Antitmst Enforcement, 17 1. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 27-28 (2003); Gregory 1. Werden, The Effect ofAntitmst Policy on Consumer
Welfare: lWJat Crandall and J.tinston Overlook (Econ. Analysis Group, Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Discussion Paper EAG 03-2, 2003) (on file with author).
84. See Crandall & Wmston, supra note 82, at 4. The great majority of their
criticisms were directed at monopoly and merger enforcement, but remedies for the alleged
overcharges that occur in collusion cases also attracted their disfavor. See id. at 6-23.
85.
See id. at 14-15. We should note that space constraints do not appear to be
responsible for such a skimpy treatment of a topic that is so crucial to their article's
conclusion. Moreover, they list fifty~nine references, but their choice of two of the articles is
unfortunate because both are deeply methodologically flawed. See id. at 24-26. The first
article, Craig M. Newmark, Does Honzontal Price-fixIng Raise Price? A Look at the Bakers
of Washington Case, 31 1.L. & ECON. 469 (1988), is analyzed in Connor, supra note 2, at 1226. The second, Michael F. Sproul, Antitmst and Prices, 101 1. POL. ECON. 741 (1993), is
criticized by Werden, supra note 83, at I. Two other studies focus on an atypical alleged
episode of price-fixing, the so-called "overlap" group of twenty-three elite U.S. universities
that met regularly to allocate needs-based graduate scholarships; this practice was permitted
to continue under a consent decree that limited the degree of detail shared. See Dennis W
Carlton et aI., Antitmst and Higher Education: Uils There a Conspiracy to Restrict Financial
Aid?, 26 RAND 1. ECON. 131 (1995); Caroline M. Hoxby, Benevolent Colluders?: The
Effects ofAntitmst Action on College Financial Aid and Tuition (Dep't of Econ., Harvard
Univ. & Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7754, 2000), available at
http://post.econornics.harvard.edU/faculty/hoxby/papers/benevol.pdf.
86. Crandall & Winston, supra note 82, at 15. They say that the lysine, citric acid,
and vitamins cases are "well known." [d. We are aware, however, of only one publication
that covers the price effects of all three of these cases with a degree of depth. See Connor,
supra note 41, at 239.
As for deterrence, Crandall and Winston rather grudgingly admit that the large DOJ
fmes meted out to cartels in recent years possibly deterred the most harmful cartels. See
Crandall & Winston, supra note 82, at 4, 22. Their reasoning, however, is difficult to
understand. Perhaps they are referring to international cartels, cartels with absolutely large
overcharges, or conspiracies with high percentage overcharges. In any case, why they expect
the probability of discovery or relative size of expected sanctions to be greater in such cases
is not clear. Moreover, the worst cartels are less likely to have been deterred by the fines

2005]

OPTIMAL CARTEL FINES

529

The view that cartels never succeed in raising prices for any
significant period has not gained many adherents in the antitrust
community. Nevertheless, concern about the lack of empirical
evidence regarding the extent of the actual harm caused by pricefixing is not confined solely to those critical of the increased exposure
of corporate defendants to fines for price-fixing. 87 Those who believe
that cartels sometimes or often can be effective naturally would like to
ascertain the extent of this problem.
Not surprisingly, many economists have studied the price effects
of individual cartels. 88 Several authors have even undertaken limited
surveys89 of this literature in the hope that the compilation of data
would help to assess the empirical extent of the anticompetitive effects
of cartels. Probably the best known of these surveys was undertaken
by Judge Posner, who reported the results in the first edition of
Antitrust Law,90 with an updated version presented in the 2001
edition.91
Posner analyzed and illustrated the social costs of
cartelization by assembling data on twelve "well-organized (mainly
international) private cartels."n He noted that "[s]uch estimates enable
since they are based on a presumption of only a 10% overcharge. Their grudging admission
is, moreover, immediately tempered by a citation to an entirely theoretical analysis of the
dangers of overdeterrence. See id
87. Refer to the discussion of this subject by Graubert, who notes that the controversy
over whether antitrust payments are excessive (which he equates with payouts greater than
reasonable damage estimates) is largely attributable to the "difficulty of gathering useful
data." John D. Graubert, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Address Before
the American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Remedies Forum 7 (Apr. 2, 2003),
available
at http://www.abanet.org/antitrustiremedies/remediesintro.doc
[hereinafter
Remedies Forum]; see also Donald C. Klawiter, After the Deluge: The PowerfUl Ef!ect of
Substantial Criminal Fines, /mpnso/1J11ent, and Other Penalties in the Age of Intemational
Cartel Enforcement, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 745, 762-63 (2001).
88.
In addition, there have been many studies of collusion that did not attempt to
ascertain how high cartels raise prices. For example, Hay and Kelley authored a classic
review of sixty-five U.S. price-fixing conspiracies. See George A. Hay & Daniel Kelley, An
Empirical Survey ofPrice Fixing Conspiracies, 17 lL. & ECON. 13 (1974). Fraas and Greer
extended this review to 606 cases from 1910 to 1972. See Arthur G. Fraas & Douglas F.
Greer, Market Structure and Pnce Collusion: An Empincal Analysis, 26 1 INDUS. ECON. 21
(1977). Both studies contain a wealth of information about the number of conspirators,
duration, industry, and specific collusive methods employed. However, neither survey
covered the topic of price effects.
89.
By "limited surveys," we mean that the authors did not attempt to encompass all
possible studies nor even all studies of some defined type or period. Surveying was ancillary
to the principal objective of the works we cite.
90. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 254 (1976).
91. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 304 (2d ed. 2001). This Article's analysis
focuses upon Posner's most recent list.
92. Id at 303. Judge Posner later explained that "these 12 were the best examples I
found of well-organized cartels, with the requisite data. If there are other well-organized
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us to derive a crude, and probably exaggerated, but nonetheless
suggestive idea of the potential benefits of antitrust policy."93 The
studies yield a median cartel overcharge of 38% and an average cartel
overcharge of 49.1 %.94 His survey is not beyond criticism,95 but a
reexamination of the original sources he relied upon produces similar
numbers (a median of37% and an average of 45.3%).96
The most recent prominent survey of collusion cases was by Greg
Werden. 97 Werden presented data from thirteen economic studies,
which showed price increases from 6.5% to 36%, with a median
increase of 18% and an average of 21.3%.98 His sample selection
criterion suggest why his results are lower than those obtained by
Posner: "The studies reviewed here examine criminally prosecuted
cartels in existence after enactment of the felony provisions of the
Sherman Act in late 1974. The price effects of cartels at earlier times
may have been substantially different because sanctions were less
severe."99
A working paper by two of the profession's most active cartel
researchers, Levenstein and Suslow, aims at assessing three
dimensions of cartel performance, one being "profitability," by which
they mean collusive margins or overcharges. loo This paper contains
five price effects for pre-World War IT cartels and seventeen for more
modem international cartels. 101 They report a median overcharge of
44.5% and a mean of 43%.102 However, the paper's estimates appear to
include some peak, rather than average figures, so the median and
mean figures may be somewhat high.

cartels with the data needed to compute the cartel price increase, I overlooked them." E-mail
from Richard A. Posner to John M. Connor (Feb. 2, 2004) (on file with author).
93. POSNER, supm note 91, at 304.
94. The low overcharge was 7% and the high was 100%. Id
9S. Interestingly, our results are more "conservative" than his.
96. The authors reanalyzed Posner's original sources and recomputed the relevant
figures somewhat differently. For example, three of the price effects that Posner reported
appear to have been short run or peak effects rather than average effects. But even after these
adjustments were made, the overall results did not change very much.
97. See genemlly Werden, supm note 83.
98.
See id at 1-2.
99. Id at I n.2. Werden notes, "While those experts [who prepared these studies]
were not neutral observers, the peer review process for publication should have screened out
studies not up to professional standards." Id
100. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?,
tbls. 8, IS (Univ. of Mich. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 02-001, 2002), http://ssm.com!
abstract=2994IS.
10 1. See id at II.
102. The low estimate was 10% and the high estimate was 100%. Id at 30, tbl. 1.8.
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A study by Professor Griffin tested an econometric model that
predicts the price effects of international cartels from information on
market structure and cartel practices. 103 The model was fitted to data
on fifty-four cartel episodes, most of which operated during the
interwar period. 104 Eliminating the sixteen episodes that were
government-sponsored and, therefore, not the subject of this study, the
mean overcharge for the thirty-eight private cartels is 45.6% and the
median is 43.9%.105
Finally, the 2003 Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) report on "hard-core" cartels contains the
results of a survey of their government members on the economic
harm caused by cartels recently prosecuted by the European
Commission or by OEeD members' national antitrust authorities. 106
Presumably, the examples chosen to be reported are among the best
documented examples from 1995 to 2001 of the degree of harm
available to the authorities. While only twelve of the responses are
expressed in terms of overcharge percentages, the usable responses
represent an unusually authoritative compilation of data on markups by
contemporary cartels that have been prosecuted by courts or
commissions.107 The twelve cases yield a median overcharge of
103. James M. Griffin, Previous Cartel Experience: Any Lessons for OPEC?, in
ECONOMICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: AN ECLECTIC APPROACH 179 (L.R. Klein & 1. Marquez
eds., 1989). Griffin specifies a fonnal cartel model which allows for a fringe of competitive,
noncooperating producers outside the cartel. /d at 184. From this theoretical model, Griffin
derives a simple empirical model that explains the degree of market power with three factors:
intracartel concentration, the share of cartel market control, and a subjective index of the
degree of the cartels' cohesion and monitoring methods. /d at 185.
104. The measure of market power is the Lerner Index. See Abba P. Lerner, The
Concept ofMonopoly and the Measurement ofMonopoly Power, 1 REv. ECON. STUD. 157,
157-75 (1934). Four of Griffin's point estimates are slightly below zero; we convert these to
zero. Griffin, supra note 103, at 189. The Lerner Index is L=(P-C)/P, where P is the
observed market price and C is the but-for or competitive price. Because C is equal to
marginal economic costs, L is also a profit margin on sales. L is zero in perfectly competitive
markets and has a maximum value of one. The monopoly overcharge is a markup: MO =(PMO is also zero in perfectly competitive markets, but can approach positive infinity
when C is very small. MO is greater than L whenever L is positive. Simple algebraic
substitution allows one to express MO as a function of L, viz., MO = U(/-L). See Lerner,
supra, at 157-75.
105. Somewhat surprisingly, government-sponsored cartels in this period had mean
overcharges virtually the same as the private schemes.
106. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (OECD), REpORT ON THE NATURE AND
IMPACT OF HARD CORE CARTELS AND SANCTIONS AGAINST CARTELS UNDER NATIONAL
COMPETITION LAWS, Annex A, 21-23 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.orgldataoecdl
16/20/2081831.pdf. A few nonmembers that participated in an OEeD-sponsored "Global
Forum on Competition" also submitted responses to the survey.
107. Seeid
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12.75% and a mean of 15.75% (with a range of 3% to 31%).108 We
excluded four of the survey results because they almost surely are peak
figures (i.e., price increases ''up to 50%") instead of averages results,
which might explain the report's conclusion that the results produce a
median that is "between 15 and 20%."109
Table 1. Summary of Seven Economic Surveys of Cartel Overcharges
Reference

Cohen and Scheffman
(\989)
2. Werden (2003)
3. Posner (2001)
4. Levenstein and Sus low
(2002)
5. Griffin (\ 989), private
cartels
6. OECD (2003),
excluding peaks
Total, simple average
Total, weighted average
I.

Number of
Cartels

Average Overcharge
Mean
Median
Percent

5-7

7.7-10.8

7.8-14.0

13
12

21
49

18
38

22

43

44.5

38

46

44

12

15.75

12.75

102-104
102-104

30.7
36.7

28.1
34.6

Despite these prior surveys, there does indeed seem to be a broad
consensus among legal and economic writers that the question of the
optimality of price-fixing penalties turns mightily on the actual degree
of harm caused by cartel conduct, and that we do not know enough
about this issue. Moreover, even if the creators of the Guidelineswere
correct that in the 1980s cartels generally raised prices by 10%,110 the
harsher cartel sanctions imposed more recently could mean that this
presumption is no longer justified. This is a gap in the literature that
we hope to remedy in this Article. The goal of this Article is to
undertake a comprehensive and systematic examination of the
questions presented at its beginning.

108. Seeid
109. Jd at 9. In addition, one of the results was "more than 14%;' but we figured it at
14%. Jd at 22.

110. In light of the data available in 1987, we certainly are not criticizing the estimate
made by AAG Ginsburg that cartels generally raised prices by roughly 10%. See Sentencing
Hearing, supra note 31, at 15. Considering the state of knowledge at the time, his estimate
was commendable. However, the broader sample available to us has yielded a larger average
overcharge percentage.
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THIS ARTICLE'S SURVEY OF OVERCHARGE STUDIES

In our quest to find case studies of the effects of cartels on price,
we examined scores of refereed journal articles, working papers,
monographs, and books that analyzed cartel ill price effects.1l2 Our
sources primarily are published peer reviewed studies by economists,
but a few were authored by historians and other serious students of the
subject. I 13 Other sources include antitrust agencies, parliamentary
These studies vary
inquiries, and multilateral organizations. 114
substantially in terms of depth and the degree of professional
commitment to the study of cartels. While we have not placed any
time limits on our literature search, three-fifths of our estimates are
from publications dated after 1973.115
We aimed at collecting the largest possible body of information
on the subject and tried to avoid applying some sort of subjective
quality screening.1l6 Consistent with most previous studies of cartel
III. We defined "cartel" to include naked price-fIXing, customer allocation, territorial
allocation, and bid-rigging conspiracies. As far as we know, no case in our sample involved
agreements that arguably were efficiency-enhancing and so might have been prosecuted
under a rule of reason.
112. The majority of economic articles are written by North American academics
using cartel episodes that affected commerce in the United States or Canada. Many were
written primarily as historical case studies and mention price effects only in passing.
113. We utilized eighty-two peer-reviewed journal articles, many of which contained
multiple estimates. The second most frequent source of estimates was the fifty-five books or
chapters in books. Some have a degree of peer review, but this varies by publisher and author.
We also should mention that a high, but unknown, share ofthe more recent articles and books
were written by economists who served as paid experts to a party involved in the litigation.
Other sources include government reports, economic working papers, and magazine articles.
Only some of these sources are subject to internal reviews by department supervisors or
senior editors. In sum, three-fourths of the estimates are drawn from the formal or informal
writings of academic social scientists, and most of the remainder was the product of
professionally trained scholars.
114. We have made every attempt to identifY and collect all useful information on
private cartel overcharges available from public sources. A few cartels operated prior to the
1890 Sherman Act, ch. 647,26 Stat. 209, so even the activities of U.S. firms probably were
legal. Moreover, many cartels headquartered in Europe predate the beginnings of antitrust
law there (the late 1950s in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the European Economic
Community). Because of this Article's antitrust orientation, commodity agreements
sponsored or protected by national sovereignty are not included. There are many fme studies
of such agreements, but the inclusion of government-sponsored or government-enforced
cartels would tend to bias upward the overcharges in our sample. In general, we will aim to
follow procedures that produce conservative results.
liS. See Connor, supra note 3, tbl. 2.
116. We have only included journalists' accounts of cartels that were book-length
treatments in the belief that such works are in-depth accounts of a cartel collected from many
sources, some of them anonymous, over a period of time, and are sufficient for the author to
provide a balanced account of conflicting claims. Books by journalists typically do not focus
on the quantitative economic aspects of the case at hand, however, so in practice there are
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effectiveness, we will treat each cartel episode as a unique
observation. 1I7 We excluded from our survey cartels that were
established or actively supported by governmental action. I IS We did
this because we primarily are interested in the question of how high
private cartels are able to raise prices without government assistance,
rather than the activities of public cartels like the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), where government officials
are directly involved in operating the cartel." 9
Our catholic approach to data-gathering may create concerns in
the minds of some readers about the reliability of the reported
overcharges. We agree that substantial variation in the quality of the
price data, the methods used, and the professional orientation of the
sources will result in substantial variation in the actual or perceived
reliability of the results. 120 Moreover, many economists trust results
published in refereed journals more than other publication outlets that
relatively few overcharges drawn from these sources in the present study. We do not include
overcharge estimates from newspaper or magazine accounts. In some cases, however, we
included overcharge estimates from articles in industry trade journals if they were cited
favorably by scholars with a background in cartel studies and otherwise seemed to constitute
serious analysis.
117. Most cartels are organized and fall apart only once, not counting brief
disciplinary price wars. This describes one episode. However, many cartels are formed,
disband, reform, and disband several times; each distinct cycle is an episode. The reasons for
analyzing episodes rather than one cartelized market over time are fairly straightforward.
Each time a new collusive episode begins, chances are that the methods and membership
composition have changed. Moreover, pauses between episodes are often quite lengthy.
Because the agreement and the players are different, a new cartel is deemed to have been
launched.
118. A few of the included cartels were merely registered with government ministries
or were state owned entities operating as private firms.
119. However, it is not always simple to decide whether a cartel is purely "public" or
"private." Some cartels unquestionably are private and illegal. Others, however, especially
cartels that operate completely outside the United States, are more difficult to classify. Some
countries outlawed cartels, but rarely if ever prosecuted them. Other countries sometimes did
prosecute cartels, but the penalties were so inconsequential that one can reasonably infer a
national policy tantamount to implicit legality.
Our survey's general approach has been to be inclusive, but we excluded results for
cartels we believe were likely to have been established or maintained by governmental action.
We have, however, included some cartels whose legality is more questionable. For example,
some of the overseas cartels might or might have been in violation of a law in one or more of
the countries in which they operated, often depending upon a number of legal requirements.
We erred on the side of including surveys of price effects of these more questionable cartels.
For comparison, however, we note that the sample of cartels in Table 2 of the Appendix
contains only cartels that unquestionably would be prosecuted as per se violations under
today's U.S. antitrust laws. See Connor, supra note 3, tbl. 2.
120. However, it does not follow that differences in analytical quality will affect the
average overcharge reported. This also is true for the studies contained in the survey articles
that were reported in the last section.
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receive less peer scrutiny, prefer modern quantitative methods to deep
historical case studies, or express skepticism about the analyses of
economists writing before the Age of Game Theory. To contend with
the disparate preferences of our readers, we have chosen to cast our
nets widely, but look across the sources for evidence of systematic
121
variation.
Moreover, we have separately analyzed a sample of peer
reviewed economics journal studies, infia Part rv.C.2.

A.

The Cartel Episodes

We found 845 useful estimates of cartel overcharges or
undercharges in nearly 200 publications l22 that analyze cartels that
operated in 234 markets. 123 Of these markets, 36% were cartelized by
international agreements,124 and the remaining 64% of the cartelized
markets were national or smaller in scope. 125 Almost one-third of the
121. Indeed, the analysis of our data by source, time period, or method may provide
useful insights in itself.
122. Overcharge estimates for identical episodes sometimes appear in multiple
publications. We are counting the total number of books, articles, and reports containing one
or more estimates. See Connor, supra note 3, tbls. 1-2.
123. See Jd; see also Connor, supra. note 2, at 56, tbl. 10. If one group of sellers
decided to fix prices for one product in one geographical region and another group colluded
on the same product in a separate geographical region, these will be viewed as two markets
(e.g., if the U.S. and Canadian cartels involving the same product were separate, they were
counted as two observations. If one cartel extended throughout North America, however, it
was counted only once). The 194 markets were affected by a total of 498 episodes. However,
three overcharge estimates were for groups of episodes (e.g., forty U.K. manufacturing cartels
in the 1950s.) Collapsing these three to single "episodes" reduces the total number of
episodes to 295.
Table 2. Number of "Average" Overcharge Observations, by Type of Cartel
Type
Number
Percent
nternational membership
365
54.2
National or regional
309
45.8
Bid-riggin~ schemes
185
27.4
Classic cartels
489
72.6
Cartels found guilty or liable'
384
57.0
No record of sanctions ("legal")
290
43.0
Total
100.0
674
Source: Connor, supra note 3, tbl. I.
Included are six cartels still being investigated by authorities.
124. "International" describes the membership composltton of the cartel, not
necessarily the geographic spread of the cartel's effects. Some international cartels affected
directly the commerce of only one nation, though the vast majority were international in both
senses.
125. A few markets were cartelized by both national and international cartels.
Typically, a domestic cartel was expanded to respond to foreign competition. The potash
cartel is one example. See Connor, supra note 3, at 7, tbl. I. In this category, we count some
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markets were affected by bid-rigging cartels. 126 This could be
significant because many believe that bid-rigging leads to higher
overcharges than otherwise identical conspiracies. '27 Finally, roughly
60% of the cartels were found guilty or liable by a court or
commission.
Two kinds of cartel markup data are available. First, researchers
usually report the average price increases over the whole episode. We
have collected 674 of these estimates.128 Some of these overcharge
estimates actually were characterized in the studies as "minimum"
estimates. To be conservative, however, we counted these minimums
as averages. 129 Second, 210 of the overcharge figures we assembled are
peak price effects,130 which we distinguish from our average
estimates. 13 1
purely national cartels that were formed for the sole purpose of controlling a nation's export
sales; in the United States, these are called Webb-Pomerene Associations. See Connor, supra
note 2, at 37. In addition, some domestic cartels had agreements with international cartels
that often protected their domestic market from exports from the international cartel's
members. Jd at 37-38. Counting episodes instead of markets, 54% are international and
46% domestic. See supra note 123, tbl. 2.
126. In Europe, bid-rigging is generally referred to as collusion involving "tenders."
Although most cartels have some sales to government entities or industrial customers that
purchase by tenders, the cartels we have classified as bid-rigging are only those explicitly
indicated by their researchers to have substantially or exclusively engaged in bid-rigging.
This means that the proportion we classify as bid-rigging is an underestimate because our
sources did not always provide enough detail on the cartels to be certain of the degree of bidrigging. The proportion of bid-rigging episodes was 27%. See supra note 123, tbl. 2.
127. See Cohen & Scheffinan, supra note 45, at 345. The Sentencing Gwaeiinesadd a
plus factor if bid-rigging is involved. USSG MANUAL, supra note 49, § 2Rl.\(b)(1).
128. See supra note 123, tbl. 2. In some cases, the avemges are carefully weighted by
the sales in each year or month of the episode, but in most cases the authors give equal
weights to the price changes in each subperiod during the total affected period. Sometimes it
is not clear from the source· whether the avemges are weighted or unweighted; if the
conspiracy period is marked by steady slow market grqwth, it matters little which is reported.
129. In addition, a few overcharges are given as narrow ranges, and we have preserved
these ranges in some tables, but because the ranges are small we have shown the midpoints of
the mnges in most tables.
130. Peak price changes indicate the potential for maximum harm when a cartel is at
its most disciplined phase or point. Classifying a particular estimate as an avemge or peak
figure in a few cases required judgment on our part due to imprecise underlying information.
If the original sour«e is unclear about which type of estimate is being presented, in. order to be
conservative we assumed that it is a peak figure. In some cases, the peak price was reached
for only one day during a cartel period of seveml years; in other cases, the peak may be the
highest year of a lengthy cartel.
131. Genemlly speaking, the peaks were at least 50% higher and typically were more
than double the avemge price enhancement achieved. The pattern of peak overcharges is
similar to that for the average overcharges. In almost all time periods, international cartels
were able to reach higher levels of price effectiveness than the domestic or "national"
cartels-on avemge 50% higher. Peak markups were not consistently related to whether the
cartel was prosecuted, except during 1891-1945 when prosecuted cartels exhibited lower peak
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Although we have collected data on cartels operating in 234
markets, we found multiple overcharge estimates for a large minority
of the markets. There are more estimates than cartelized markets for
two reasons. First, about half of the markets experienced multiple
distinct phases or "episodes"l32 across which the price effects
differed. I33 Second, for a few episodes, more than one study has been
published. 134 Further, for a given episode, multiple methods of
estimation are sometimes available.

R

Results ofthe Survey

The overcharge estimates are presented in Table 3, divided into
periods that roughly distinguish different antitrust regimes in the
United States and abroad. The era up to 1890 is an obvious choice
because of the enactment of the Sherman Act. The next break, 1919
was chosen because it represents the end of a period of U.S. antitrust
activism and, because of World War I, a date by which most
international cartels, many of them with U.S. corporate members, had
ceased operating. 135

price changes. And, consistent with our earlier fmdings, cartels that fIxed prices or
production levels were signifIcantly more harmful than bid-rigging agreements. For a more
extensive analysis of the peak results, see Connor, supra note 2, at 39, 52-55.
132. If a cartel had more than one episode, each episode typically had changes in
membership composition, the terms of the collusive agreement, method of management,
geographic focus, or other major factors. We have identifIed a total of 333 to 539 episodes,
depending on how they are counted.
Under current anti cartel enforcement standards each episode is potentially an actionable
offense. However, many legal systems treat a string of closely related episodes as one cartel.
Moreover, some cartels prosecuted for fIxing prices in multiple product markets can be
viewed as a single offense for legal purposes, but as several cartels from an economic
perspective.
133. In other words, when a cartel is distinctly reformed, it enters a new phase. The
aluminum market, for example, went through six distinct phases that sometimes were
adjacent in time and sometimes were several years apart. This heavily researched cartel has
twenty-eight overcharge observations. See Connor, supra note 3, at 2, tbl. I. Another study
from which we obtained a dozen observations summarized the results of 109 price-fIxing
convictions in the fluid milk markets of the southeastern United States within a few years.
Robert F. Lanzillotti, The Great School Milk Conspiracies ofthe 1980s, II REv. INDUS. ORG.
413,428 (1996). We count each conviction as an episode. However, other studies that we
cite incorporate multiple temporal phases.
134. For example, for the various alw:ninum cartels we drew on nine studies written by
eight authors. See Connor, supra note 3, at 12-14, tbl. 2.
135. Many of the prewar cartels were reestablished after 1919, but in the majority of
instances without the active participation of U.S. frrms in price-setting or quota-setting. In
addition, scores of U.S. criminal prosecutions of international cartels during 1940-1945
clarifIed the illegality of many more subtle forms of cartel participation, such as patent pools
and cross-licensing of technologies. See Connor, supra note 2, at 42.
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The post-World War II era is divided into three subperiods: 1946
to 1974, 1974 to 1991, and 1991 to the present. I36 This division was
made because one milestone in U.S. anticartellegislation was the 1974
law that made price-fixing a felony, thereby lengthening maximum
individual prison sentences and strengthening the bargaining power of
the DOl I37 In addition, the period 1991 to the present constitutes the
modem era. By 1990, all the present criminal sanctions available to
the U.S. government through 2004 were in place. In 1991, penalties
for corporations rose from $1 million to $10 million. 138 Moreover,
1987 legislation enabled the DO] to impose fines above the $10
million statutory cap.139 These and other policy changes made in the
early 1990s were in some cases adopted by the EU and other antitrust
authorities, which significantly improved the investigation and
prosecution of international cartels. '40
Several features of our data set are apparent from Table 3. There
is an overall upward trend in number of observations per year. 141 The
primary factor that explains the trend is the growth in the number of
international cartels with usable data. The proportion of international
schemes is especially high during the interwar period and after 1990
and especially low during the period from 1946 to 1990. The large
number of overcharges available for our data set in the 1990s is mainly

136. The tranSItion years 1945-1973 correspond with several important relevant
changes in anticartel enforcement. First, the antitrust idea became firmly implanted in the
laws of countries outside North America for the fIrst time: Germany and Japan in 1947, the
United Kingdom in 1956, and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958.
CHRISTOPHER HARDING & JULIAN JOSHUA, REGULATING CARTELS IN EUROPE: A STUDY OF
LEGAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE DELINQUENCY 86-87, 107-08 (2003). Second, the European
Commission (EC), the administrative arm of the EEC, successfully prosecuted its fIrst cartel
in 1969. Id at 121. Third, U.S. price-fixing enforcement penalties became significantly
more severe at the end of this period. Beginning around 1961, the DOJ began seeking guilty
pleas from defendants, rather than allowing nolo contendre pleas, which eased the burden of
proof for plaintiffs in civil treble-damage suits. See Connor, supra note 2, at 42.
137. Although the prosecution of price-fixing of domestic conspiracies was at a high
level in 1974-1990, the investigation of international cartels was not a high priority for DOl
Nor did it have success in the courtroom in the few cases it did pursue. See Connor, supra
note 2, at 43.
138. USSG MANUAL, supra note 49, § 2Rl.l, historical notes, 1991 amends.
139. See FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK, supra note 48, § 2Rl.l,
Commentary, Background (stating that fines may exceed $10,000,000 for convictions on
mUltiple counts).
140. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REpORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL annex 4-A (2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/fmaJreport.htm.
141. The interwar period 1920-1945 is well above the trend, while the 1946-1990
periods are below it.
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due to the launching of a historically high number of international
cartel cases since the early 1990s.
Table 3. Number of Average Overcharge Observations by Year and Type
Cartel
Episode
End
Date

Membership

National

.

International

Legal Status
Found
Guiltyb

Legal or
,
Unknown

Bid-Rigging
Primary
Conduct

Other

Number
17804
60
59
5
9
55
1890
189159
9
88
61
36
38
1919
19201
155
9
147
45
111
1945
194620
63
29
39
53
72
1973
197420 (1 EU)
19
40
39
59
60
1990
1991137(11
17
92
94
49
169
EU)
2004
489
384
290
185
Total
309
365
Source: Connor, supra note 4, tbls. 1&2 .
• Cartels with corporate members from two or more countries. Those with all members
from the EU shown in parentheses.
bAt least one member of the cartel pleaded guilty, was found guilty at trial, paid civil
antitrust fInes, was the object of an adverse commission decision, or made a monetary
settlement with the plaintiffs in a private suit.
, No evidence of guilty pleas, fmes, consent decrees, or monetary penalties in the
publication sources consulted. Includes registered export cartels.

A second important trend is that most cartel data now arise from
prosecuted cartels. Prior to 1946, less than 30% of our observations
refer to cartels known to have been prosecuted.1 42 Until the early
1970s, national and international cartels comprised of European
companies could form cartels subject only to registration requirements
in most European countries (and the EEC after 1960). The European
Commission began imposing fines on unregistered cartels that affected
EEC trade beginning in 1969. 143 During 1974-1990, u.s. corporate
sanctions on cartels became significantly harsher, and the European

142. The nine observations from a prosecuted cartel prior to 1890 refer to the U.S.
anthracite coal market, which began as early as 1829 but was not convicted until eighty years
later. See Connor, supra note 3, at 47-49.
143. See HARDING & JOSHUA, supra note 136, at 121.
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Union's prosecutions moved in the same direction.'44 After 1990,90%
of the cartels in our sample were studied after they were prosecuted or
fined by one or more antitrust authority. This pattern does not
necessarily mean that the probaJ:>ility of discovery by prosecuting
bodies has gone up significantly, but it probably does represent a
heightened aggressiveness in anticartel enforcement as well as a shift
in research methods by social scientists. '45
A third trend manifest in Table 3 is the prominence of estimates
derived from bid-rigging conspiracies since 1945. In 1946-1973,42%
of the episodes in our sample were primarily bid-rigging conspiracies;
after 1973, half of the episodes involved rigged bids, many of them
local milk or construction conspiracies in the United States. Most of
the immediate victims of bid-rigging conspiracies were governments.
Relatively few international cartels rely primarily on rigging auctions
or tenders for public projects. 146
1.

Trends in Average Overcharges over Time

Table 4 displays the medians of all average overcharges reported,
distinguished by the same time periods and types used for Table 3. We
choose to show the median overcharge percentages rather than the
mean overcharge percentages because a few very high overcharges in
any particular category can overwhelm a mean calculated using the
larger number oflow-to-medium percentage overcharges. '47
The median cartel overcharge for all types and time periods (a
median that includes a significant number of zeros) is 25%.148 There is
144. Both jurisdictions imposed historically unprecedented penalties on international
cartels beginning in the late 1990s. See John M. Connor, Private Intemationai Cartels:
Effectiveness, H--elfare, and Anticartel EnfOrcement 16-29, 32-37 (Dep't of Agric. Econ.,
Purdue Univ., Staff Paper No. 03-12, June 18, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfin?abstracUd=611909.
145. In the last decade, announcements of probes, guilty pleas, and fines on cartelists
are found more and more to be in convenient internet sites and through internet search
engines than they were formerly.
146. What may seem like a surge in this practice may, in fact, be a reflection of
changes in data availability. Most of the articles we have found on bid-rigging have drawn on
public records of state or federal agencies that have been the objects of these conspiracies. It
is possible that the increase in bid-rigging cases seen in our data is simply due to the advent
of open-records laws at the state and municipal levels similar to the federal Freedom of
Information Act., Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
147. In such situations the means are larger than the medians, and the median is a
better representation of central tendency. Means, medians, and standard deviations are shown
in Connor, supra note 3, at 74, tbl. 3.
148. The successful cartels (those with non-zero overcharges) overcharged by an
average of 28% to 29%. Note that the 1946-1973 period displays the lowest overcharges; if
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no strong trend in the cartel markups for all types over time, but if one
examines the national cartels and international cartels separately the
downward trend is more pronounced. 149 For the "classic" and punished
cartels, moderate downtrends are evident. 150 However, for two types of
cartels, bid-rigging and unsanctioned, there is no significant decline in
average overcharges. It should, however, be noted that since 1990, the
average overcharges of discovered cartels fell to 25% for international
cartels. 151 Moreover, the thirty post-1990 domestic observations had a
mean overcharge of26.2% and a median overcharge of24.5%.152
It is difficult to know what to make of the downtrends in
profitability for most types of cartels. The influence of the spread of
effective anticartel enforcement is perhaps the most obvious
explanation. 153 The downward trend in overcharges among cartels that
were caught by antitrust authorities tends to support the idea that
carte lists find it increasingly difficult to hide their activities.
Alternatively, the greater antitrust scrutiny in the United States from
the 1940s and from Europe since the 1960s could prompt carte lists to
refrain from full monopoly pricing increases so as to reduce the
chances of detection. Some of these hypotheses will be investigated
below.

the Commission examined national cartels from this period, its 10% presumption is not
unreasonable.
149. The simple correlation of median overcharges for all types over the six time
periods is -0.29, but the correlations over time for the national and international cartels are 0.61 and -0.64, respectively. The declining overcharge rate after 1890 is verified in a more
formal meta-regression analysis that controls for publication sources, calculation method, and
several cartel characteristics. See John M. Connor & Yuliya Bolotova, A Meta-Analysis of
Cartel Overcharges, INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. (forthcoming 2006) (on file with author).
150. Correlations are -0.33 and -0.39.
151. There were 137 international cartels analyzed for this period.
152. One estimate was a zero. Of the thirty observations, ten were bid-rigging, with
mean and median overcharges of 21.5% and 16.5%, respectively.
153. There are also other possibilities. Perhaps the application of more sophisticated
quantitative methods by researchers in recent decades systematically yield lower estimates of
price effects than the earlier studies that relied on simpler before-and-after comparisons.
Perhaps expected profit rates in cartelized industries have declined as an effect of
globalization, and those companies that join cartels are satisfied with smaller percentage
increases from collusion. Industry mix also could provide an explanation. The sample drawn
from the earlier periods tends to contain more minerals and metals conspiracies, whereas the
later estimates have a higher proportion of chemical, construction, and services firms
represented.
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Average Overcharges Across Types: International and Bidnggmg

A second pattern that emerges in Table 4 is that in every period
studied international cartels have been more harmful than domestic
(mostly based in the US.) cartels. International cartels are about 75%
154
more effective in raising prices than domestic or "national" cartelS.
This is not so surprising in the pre-World War II era because
international cartels could operate without fear of prosecution. Even
in the interwar period, US. companies may have operated under the
assumption that they had structured their participation in a manner that
would not run afoul the Sherman Act. But it is somewhat unexpected
that the differences persisted in the postwar period is somewhat
unexpected. The clearly greater price effectiveness demonstrated by
international agreements may be due to a greater freedom from
competition than would be true for geographically localized cartels. 155
The cartels from which we collected the data on overcharges
functioned over various geographic spaces. Some confined their
operations to one nation, some to several countries in one continent,
some were national conspiracies on export trade only, and some
straddled continents (the last we refer to as global). Classifying the
locus of cartel operations is usually straightforward because the
headquarters of the members can be identified. If a significant share
of the cartel's membership hailed from two or more continents, it is
categorized as global. Export cartels are mostly drawn from single
nations, but a few were composed of companies from several
European countries. In our sample, 36% of the estimates were drawn
from US. and Canadian cartels, 35% from Europe, 8% from other
continents, and 20% were global conspiracies. 156
There are significant differences in average overcharges across
cartels by geographic type. Those managed in single European
countries have the highest median overcharges (43%), but curiously
those organized across national boundaries in Western Europe were as
a group the least successful (16% median overcharge). North
American conspiracies also had quite low average overcharges (21 %).

154. These are cartels that fixed prices in one country and export cartels comprised of
finns from single countries. In three periods, international cartels were twice as profitable.
155. Connor, supra note 2, at 48. Also, international cartels are more likely to be
involved with internationally tradable commodities with comparatively low long-distance
transportation costs. /d
156. See id at 56, tbl. 9.
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Median overcharges for Asian-based and global conspiracies were
relatively high (29%).157
A third pattern noted in Table 4 is the inferior price effects of bidrigging cartels (median 21 %) compared to conventional conspiracies
that set selling prices or allocated market shares (25-29%). Bidrigging cartels often were organized to exploit tenders for government
public works projects. Relatively few international cartels engage in
bid-rigging, whereas bid-rigging occurs mostly in national or local
conspiracies, so this distinction may be confounded with the
geographic types just discussed above. Nevertheless, this finding
directly contradicts prior economic conclusions l58 and the Umted States
Sentencing Guidelines that impose higher penalties for bid-rigging.159
It also challenges a rationale of the U.S. Government's overt policy
shift in the 1980s that made bid-rigging conspiracies a higher
priority. 160
Table 4. Median of Average Cartel Overcharges, by Year and Type
Cartel
Episode
End Date

Membership
National

International

Legal Status

Bid-Rigging

Found
Primary
Legal
Guilty
Conduct
Median Percent'

Other

All
Types

178024
23.5
22
41
32
22
16
1891
189130.4
25
28
37
21
48
35
1919
192034
34.0
18
45
32
34
36-37
1945
194615
14
13
23
15.0
26
13
1973
197422
21
25-26
24.0
37
18-20
40-43
1990
199122
25
24.0
24-25
20
17-18
25
2004
ALL
21
25-29
17-19
23-25
28
25.0
30-33
YEARS
Source: Connor, supmnote4, tbl. 3 .
•Medians of the lower bounds or the upper bounds of ranges, where appropriate. Includes
many zero estimates. See Table 3 for the numbers of observations in each cell.

157. Seeid.
158. See Cohen & Scheffman, supm note 45, at 345.
159. SeeUSSG MANuAL, supmnote 49, § 2Rl.l(b)(l).
160. See Connor, supmnote 144, at 49.
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Another interesting statistic concerns the low number of
overcharges by unsuccessful cartels. Only about 7% of the data we
collected indicated that a cartel episode was unsuccessful in
controlling prices significantly. 161 We did, of course, include these
observations in the calculations that appear in Table 4.
3.

Overcharges and Market Size

A commentary in the Commission's Guidelines asserts that there
is an inverse relationship between the size of affected sales and the
height in percent of the overcharges achieved by cartels. 162 The
commentary, however, presents no conceptual or empirical justification for this assertion. We are aware of no study of cartels available to
the Commission that analyzed this relationship or provided an
empirical or theoretical reason for this conclusion. 163
Nevertheless, we decided to attempt to examine whether this
hypothesis might be valid. The only source of appropriate data, of
which we are aware, is a working paper by Connor that developed
affected sales and overcharge data for a group of modem international
cartels. l64 This paper contains ninety-two useful observations, and we
were able to calculate correlation statistics for a number of
subsamples. The first sample of fifty cartels examined the largest
geographic market for each cartel; the coefficient was not significantly
different from zero. 165 We also examined geographic subgroups of the
cartels: global, U.S., EU, and other single national markets. The
correlations for these four samples varied from -0.17 to +0.24, but
none were statistically significant. The data therefore suggest that
there is no support for the GWdelines' size-overcharge connection.
The policy implication is that there is no justification for going easy on
the largest cartels discovered in recent years, such as the vitamins
cartel.
161. We do not want to make too much of this statistic, however, because it may reflect
selection bias by the authors of the studies that were published. Injurious cartels might be
more noteworthy or interesting than incompetent cartels.
162. See USSG MANUAL, supra note 49, § 2Rl.I, application nA ("Another
consideration in setting the fme is that the average level of mark-up due to price-fixing may
tend to decline with the volume of commerce involved.").
163. See Cohen & Scheffinan, supra note 45, at 344-45.
164. See generally Connor, supra note 144.
165. The correlation coefficient r = -0.105. To see whether extreme observations
might unduly affect the result, we repeated the experiment but dropped fITSt all cartels with
$5 billion in sales or more and second all cartels with overcharges of 65% or higher; in both
cases rbecame closer to zero (-0.065 and +0.019, respectively), which indicates that extreme
observations do not affect the low correlation we have found.
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Size Distribution of Overcharges

Given our interest in the foundations of the United States
Sentencing Gwdelines, examining the size distribution of our
estimates would be logical. Table 5 classifies our average estimates
into nine categories by size. Because of the Guideline~ 10%
overcharge assumption for the average cartel, this break: point is of
special interest. 166
Table 5. Mean Average Overcharges by Size Category
Percentage Range'

Nwnber of Observations

Distribution of Observations

Mean
Total
Non-Zero
Nwnber
Percent
Zero or less 0
46
0
7
0
90'
0.1-9.9
6.3
14
15
10.0-19.9
122
14.1
19
21
20.0-39.9
182
28.6
29
31
99
40.0-59.9
47.9
16
17
60.0-79.9
39
67.8
6
7
80.0-99.9
13
88.6
2
2
100.0-199.9
25
129.0
4
4
200 or greater
19
429.8
3
3
49.4 '
Total
635
100
100
Source: Connor, supra note 3, at 51 tbl. 7; Connor, supra note 4, tbl. 2 .
• Overcharges of 10% or higher are rounded to the nearest whole nwnber. Midpoints of
ranges.
b Four negative nwnbers are converted to zero.
, Four estimates of "weak cartels" are asswned to be 1% overcharges.
d Fifteen estimates of 50% are from Eckbo (1976).
'Excluding zeros, the mean is 78.4%.
Q

Perhaps the most striking result from Table 5 is that 79% of the
overcharges are above the 10% presumption that is the cornerstone of
the Sentencing Gwdelines. Indeed, 60% of the cartel episodes have
overcharges above 20%. The mean overcharge of the episodes in the
two lowest size ranges (0.1 to 19.9) is 11.6%. Perhaps these were the
cartels imagined to be typical by the creators of the United States
Sentencing GuidelineS? By contrast, the cartel episodes with
overcharges of 20% or higher have a mean overcharge of 75.30/0-more than seven times the level assumed by the Gwdeline~ authors. If
the Guidelines were examined from the perspective of whether they

166. Connor, supra note 2, at 51.
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are likely to deter recidivism, fines building upon a 10% presumption
would underdeter the vast majority of cartels. 167
C

ReliabjJjty

Analysts may have prior beliefs about the most appropriate data
and methods to be used to derive estimates of the price effects of
cartels. Some might regard a detailed historical investigation with
access to the internal communications of a cartel's managers as the
surest path to the truth. Others might give greater credence to such
communications only where the cartelists had reason to believe that
their activities were legal or where the managers were writing about an
illegal cartel years after the statute of limitations had passed. Some
might assume that disinterested social scientists are likely to be closer
to the mark than prosecutors, plaintiffs' counsel, defendants' counsel,
or other interested parties. '68 Among social scientists, ever cognizant of
the march of progress in quantitative research methods, there may be a
tendency to find peer-reviewed studies applying methods of the most
recent vintage to highly disaggregated, detailed data the most reliable.
As a result, we employed three approaches in an attempt to learn
whether the various overcharge estimates are sensitive to the methods,
data sources, time period, or disciplines of the authors. 169
1.

Sources of the Estimates

Confidence in the estimates may be judged in part by the sources
from which the overcharge estimates were derived. For example, 65%
of the estimates are drawn from the traditional end-product outlets of
academic research:
academic books, book chapters, and peerreviewed journals. 170 In addition, 15% of the estimates were taken
from economist's working papers, most of which were distributed
since 2000. These sources examined modem international cartels and
appear to be intermediate versions of book chapters and journal
manuscripts.
167. See Jd Moreover, the cartels that did not succeed in raising prices are less likely
to be prosecuted by the enforcement authorities. By including these cartels in our
calculations we may be underestimating the expected harms from the type of cartels that the
enforcers are likely to prosecute.
168. See id at 57. Indeed, the cross checks of a more global retrospective analysis
might contradict delusions of cartel managers about their power over markets. Id
169. These analyses are reported in detail in Connor, supra note 2, at 56-67. More
formal analysis of the variation in the estimates are in Connor & Bolotova, supra note 149, at
14-43.
170. See Connor, supra note 2, at 58, tbl. 11.
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We examined whether the average overcharge estimates which
appeared in "peer-reviewed" sources are different from those that did
171
not. Furthermore, to allow for improvements in analytical rigor over
time, we categorize publications into three time periods: 1888-1945,
1946-1973, and 1974-2003.172 Finally, we divide the observations into
those cartels that are known to have been legally sanctioned and those
not sanctioned.
The results are shown in Table 6. Peer review does not
systematically produce lower estimates of overcharges. In fact, among
cartels that were not prosecuted, peer review since 1946 tends to result
in slightly higher estimates than other sorts of studies. However, in the
case of convicted cartels, peer-reviewed studies do display lower
average overcharges; for example, the median overcharge of convicted
cartels from peer-reviewed publications since 1973 was 22%; from
other type of publications, the median was 36%. We note that the
differences in overcharges between peer-reviewed and other types of
studies narrowed over time.173
Table 6. Average Percentage of Cartel Overcharges,
by Legal Status and Type of Study
Date of
Publication

Convicted Cartels'
Peer
Other
b
Reviewed

Legal and Undiscovered Cartels
Peer Reviewed b

Other

Median
16
26
23
26
Before 1946
1946-1973
10
35
65
39
1974-2004
22
31
24
36
• At least one closely related episode was subject to an adverse decision of a court,
commission, or antitrust authority.
b Peer review academic journals, dissertations, court and commission decisions, and OECD
reports.
I 71. Peer review is held in high regard by scientists, and the process might induce
caution in authors presenting overcharges for archival publications. We defined "peerreviewed" sources to include academic journals, dissertations, and reports issued by the
OECD. This is a restrictive concept of peer review, because doubtless some of the books and
chapters from conference proceedings were also peer reviewed.
172. These are the same demarcations discussed in supra Part IY.B.
173. Connor, supra note 2, at 66. Looking only at peer-reviewed studies of discovered
cartels, there is one finding that is either a bizarre coincidence or a highly revealing hint
about the source of the "10% rule." Among the estimates drawn from 1946-1973 peerreviewed publications, the median overcharge is exactly 10%. If the Sentencing Guidelines
were based upon these studies, they could be considered to have had a perfectly rational
foundation. However, after 1974, peer-reviewed studies of convicted cartels tended to have
average overcharges that were 120% higher. It is likely that the sample of studies published
during 1946-1973 was biased toward bid-rigging cartels, which we have shown were less
destructive schemes than the classic or international cartels that would be studied after 1973.
Id at 66-67.
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Perhaps the strongest pattern that emerges from Table 6 is the
contrast between convicted and other cartels. Comparing the two
columns of peer-reviewed studies, the undiscovered and presumptively
legal cartels consistently generated higher price markups than
unconvicted cartels. This finding has significant implications for
anticartel policy because it suggests that, ceten's pan'bus, less effective
cartels are the ones most likely to be caught and sanctioned. It also
suggests that there is a large social payoff from increasing the
probability of cartel detection. 174
2.

Sensitivity to Publication Dates
Here we examine the question whether there are systematic
differences between the average overcharges across time, using the
date of publication of the study as a proxy for analytical advances. The
intuition here is that the authors of more recent empirical studies of
cartels have learned to avoid the methodological pitfalls of their
predecessors. Among the economic studies that dominate the sample,
there is an undeniable trend away from mere narrative historical case
studies sometimes embellished with simple graphical illustrations,
toward more formal statistical modeling. In industrial economics,
there is a trend away from evaluating cartels from the point of view of
the theory of pure monopoly toward a more sophisticated and nuanced
view informed by game theory and other conceptual advances.
Table 7. Average Overcharge Estimates by Publication and End Dates
Cartel Episode End
Date
Before 1891
Median
Mean
1891-1945
Median
Mean
1946-1990
Median
Mean

Before 1945

Publication Date of Study
1971-1989
1945-1970

22.6"
25.4

25.1
39.4

22.3
30.7

30.0"
29.6

26.0"
47.4

39.5"
74.6

39.0'"
42.4

29.0'"
39.0

12.5"
21.6

19.5"'
28.3

23.048
49.2

·

·
··

.
.

..

1991-2003
Median
Mean
Source: Connor, supra note 3, at 59 tbl. 12; Connor, supra note 4, tbl. 2.
Note: Superscripts indicate sample size in cell.

174. Id at 67.

1990-2004

24.5
40.2

111
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Table 7 classifies publications according to four periods that
correspond roughly to milestones in social-science analysis of cartels:
before 1891, 1891-1945, 1946-1989, and 1990-2004. 175 It is not
obvious that overcharges vary systematically over time. For example,
in the case of cartels that ended in the pre-antitrust era, one sees that
both contemporary and early writers arrived at moderate estimates of
cartel price effects-median estimates of 22% to 30%. Studies
published prior to 1990 tended to calculate relatively low median price
effects. As the methods of scholarship improved, the estimated price
effects of cartels active in the most laissez-faire of economic
environments actually rose to a median of 30%. Nevertheless, simple
correlations of overcharges over time do show downtrends for some
types of cartels, but this trend could be confounded with a greater
proportion of peer-reviewed publications in contemporary research.176
3.

Intra-Episode Comparisons

The third check on reliability of estimates across various
analytical methods controls for changes in the composition of the
sample by focusing on pairs of estimates applied to identical cartel
episodes. Recall that a cartel episode refers to a single market, time
period, and form of cartel organization. There are 291 pairs of
observations available for this analysis of reliability, which examines
six general methods of estimation. 177
By and large, Table 8 shows that different methods applied by
different authors to identical cartel episodes do not result in markedly
different estimates.178 Nevertheless, there are three differences worth
noting. One somewhat surprising result is that the before-and-after
175. For an explanation of why these periods were chosen, see supra Part IVB.
176. For a more complete analysis of these results, see Connor, supra note 2, at 59-62.
177. The most widely used is the so-called before-and-after method in which the price
during the episode is compared to one of three "but-for" or base prices. The "method
unspecified" estimates are on average quite close to the before-and-after price method. The
second most popular method is statistical modeling, which accounts for 20% of the estimates.
The yardstick method accounts for about 10% of the sample. Overcharges derived from
costs of production or profits are the least frequently employed method (about 3%). These
five methods have been sanctioned by u.s. courts for determining damages in price-fixing
trials. See John M. Connor, Global Cartels Redux: The Amino ACId Lysine Antitrust
Litigation, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 252-76 (4th ed. 2004). Sixth, approximately 10%
of this study's estimates are quotes from or interpretations of decisions made by antitrust
authorities. Systematic differences across methods ought to be of forensic interest.
178. The correspondence among the estimates using but-for prices before, during, or
after a conspiracy is quite close. A more formal analysis verifies that estimates based on precartel prices are not significantly different from those using postcartel prices as the
benchmark. See Connor & Bolotova, supra note 149, at 36-37, tbl. 6.
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method produces cartel-overcharge estimates that are quite a bit lllgher
than the econometric model applied to the same data. To be specific,
the pre-cartel but-for prices are typically double estimates derived from
econometric models, and the postcartel prices are triple. Econometric
techniques offer the opportunity to the analyst to make precise
allowances for several sources of shifts in demand and supply, for
seasonality, for trends in technology, and for feedback effects. If, in
fact, econometric techniques are the most accurate, what this result
seems to suggest is that authors of traditional before-and-after analyses
are failing to adjust for all the competitive factors that might drive up
the competitive benchmark price. Second, compared with the beforeand-after, the cost-based and yardstick techniques yield relatively high
overcharge estimates. This suggests that the methods that use costs or
profits fail to fully account for all competitive industry costs, perhaps
those related to product marketing or overhead. Similarly, as most of
the yardsticks are prices in regions in which the cartel did not attempt
to fix prices, this result suggests that indirect geographic spillovers
from cartel activity may be more common than most analysts
anticipate. If the yardsticks are product substitutes, analysts may have
inadequately adjusted for quality differences.
Table 8. Median Ratios of Estimates for Same Episodes
but Different Methods
Numerator
Method

Denominator Method
Median ratio
Unspecified

Before and
After'

Cost
Based

D

Yardstick

Econometric
Model
11
1.86

Unspecified
72
2
0.9239
0.7220
1.00
0.74
method
Before and
143
33
1.07 39
0.78 IS
2.01 56
1.00
0.68
after
Cost based
1.34
0.60
1.00 "
2.10
1.29 "
4
1.39 zu
Yardstick
1.48"
0.48
0.57
1.00 '
Econometric
4
21
7
1.00 78
0.54
0.507 56
1.76
1.66
model
Source: Connor, supra note 4, tbl. 2.
--= No pairs available
, Comparison of effective cartel price to base period below.
b The median overcharge of the numerator method divided by the median of the
denominator method.

In summary, overcharge estimates are sensitive to analytical
method. Authors estimating cartel overcharges employ the before-and-
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after or econometric methods more commonly than any others, and the
first results in larger estimates than the second for identical cartel
179
episodes.
Moreover, more often than not, the cost-based and
yardstick methods also produce relatively high estimates of
overcharges. 180

v.

SURVEY OF FINAL VERDICTS IN CARTEL CASES

In theory, we should be able to determine how high cartels raise
prices by a straightforward examination of a statistically significant
sample of the many antitrust cases that involved cartels. However, the
amount that prices changed, or even whether prices were affected at
all, is not relevant to the issue of whether a cartel violated the antitrust
laws. 181 It, therefore, is unnecessary for the court in criminal antitrust
cases to calculate the extent of any overcharges or undercharges. 182 In
civil cases, however, the damages awarded to a successful plaintiff are
equal to three times the overcharges,183 so in these cases, the plaintiff
must demonstrate how much prices increased or decreased due to the
actions of the cartel.
The necessary research has proven to be extremely difficult to
undertake, however, because almost every private antitrust suit for
179. In our sample, 59% of the average estimates were of these types.
180. If true, this suggests that to protect defendants' rights the cost-based and yardstick
methods ought to be treated with healthy skepticism in forensic proceedings.
181. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 165-233 (2000). This shows that in per se cases, the plaintiff does
not have to prove whether prices rose (or even whether defendants had market power). The
issue of whether prices rose can be an element of a rule of reason case, but rule of reason
cases do not give rise to criminal fines, and so are not the subject of this Article.
182. Normally, the government simply relies upon the 10% overcharge presumption.
On this basis, the prosecutors and the defendants typically settle upon a criminal fine without
calculating the actual overcharges involved. The first time in which the federal government
attempted to prove the size of cartel overcharges was United States v. Andreas, in which the
defendants were convicted of conspiring to fix the price and allocate the sales of lysine. No.
96 CR 762, 1999 WL 515484, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1999). The DOl recommended that
the court apply the alternative sentencing provisions of 18 U.S.c. § 3571(d) (1996). Id at *3.
The court conditionally denied the defendants' motion to reject the sentencing provisions, and
granted the parties' motion for an evidentiary hearing to present economic evidence regarding
the gains or losses attributable to the conspiracy. Id The DO] retained the expert opinion of
an economist, who based his estimate of the defendants' gains on a hypothetical "but-for"
price. Id at *4. When the defendants requested more time to research and respond to the
expert's opinion, the court ordered the DO] to assist the defendants in obtaining the necessary
sales, price, and volume information from other lysine producers. Id at *7. The court later
found, however, that the DOl's production of economic data was insufficient, and therefore
granted the defendants' motion to bar imposition of the alternative fine provision. Id at *9-14.
183. 15 U.S.c. § 15(a) (2000). The statute also provides that successful plaintiff will
recover reasonable attorney's fees and expenses. Id
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damages settles or is dismissed before an overcharge can be calculated
by a neutral observer and made part of the public record of the case.
As a consequence, final verdicts involving cartels where a judge, jury,
or commission l84 calculated an overcharge are surprisingly rare. As an
example of their scarcity, there apparently has never been even a single
final verdict in a damages case involving indirect purchasers, even
though this is a very actively litigated area of antitrust law where more
than 100 cases have been filed against a single defendant. 18s
The reasons for this high settlement rate are not completely
clear. 186 One reason is because the litigation is so risky and expensive
that settlement often is the most logical alternative for both parties. 187
Rather than incurring substantial litigation expenses,188 risking personal
and corporate time, expenses, and disruption for clients,189 and facing

184. Although there have been cases where its staff entered into agreements with
defendants over the size of the illegal overcharges, we know of no cases where the FTC
calculated the actual size of a cartel overcharge.
185. See Robert H. Lande, My Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised, 16 Loy.
CONSUMER L. REv. 329, 339 (2004); Denger, supra note 79, at 4. For example, a very reliable
source reported that in recent years at least 137 antitrust cases alleging overcharges were filed
against Microsoft alone, involving both Sherman Act section 1 and Sherman Act section 2
allegations. See Jonathan Groner, Chalk Up a Few Wins for Microsoft, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 2,
2000, atA4.
As of July 2004, almost all had been dismissed or settled, and there have been no fmal
verdicts. See Robert Weisman, Microsoft OKs $34M Settlement in Mass., BOSTON GLOBE,
June 30, 2004, at Fl.
186. Most civil cases of all types settle or are dismissed. We have no information as to
whether cartel cases are more likely to settle or be dismissed than other types of antitrust or
nonantitrust cases. The fact that we have been able to fmd so few final cartel verdicts,
however, suggests that the number of cases that settle may be higher. Unfortunately, these
settlements virtually always provide little public information that would be useful for our
purposes. Bentson notes that the most ambitious empirical study of private antitrust cases
yielded too little publicly available information on settlement amounts to justifY analysis.
George J. Bentson, A Comprehensive Analysis of the Detenninants of Private Antitrust
Litigation, with Particular Emphasis on Class Action Swts and the Rule ofJoint and Several
Damages, in PRIvATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING 272, 318
(Lawrence J. White ed., 1988).
187. This type of complex litigation that goes to final judgment has sometimes
colloquially been termed a "mutual suicide pact" because of the ardor involved for all
concerned.
188. See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Private Antitrust Litigation:
Introduction and Framework, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW
LEARNING, supra note 186, at 3, 13. They calculated that attorneys' fees average 30% to 50%
of the overcharge amount. Elzinga and Wood calculate attorneys' fees as being 58-102% of
the overcharge. See Kenneth G. Elzinga & William C. Wood, The Costs ofthe Legal System
in Pn·vate Antitrust Enforcement, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW
LEARNING, supra note 186, at 126.
189. The cost of this disruption to the affected firms can be tremendous. See Lande,
supra note 15, at 142-44. James T. Halverson was reported to have recommended
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an uncertain probability of an uncertain magnitude of gains (or a total
lossI90), counsel for all parties often recommend and negotiate a
comprollllse.
It might instead be useful to ask why some cartel cases do not
settle. One possibility is that the nonsettling cases are most likely to be
those in which the parties have different beliefs as to the likelihood of
victory. Settlement is very difficult if plaintiffs are optimistic that they
will prevail and the award will be large, while defendants believe the
opposite. For this reason, nonsettling cases might be those in which
liability and damages are least susceptible to prediction, and in which
the expected likelihood or magnitude of liability cannot be predicted
with even a small amount of confidence. 191
Since most cartel cases settle, it might be desirable to survey
settlements as one way of determining the size of the cartel
overcharges. 192 However, settlement amounts are too frequently an

that a defendant take exhaustive discovery, particularly if it has an advantage over
the plaintiff in terms of resources. Halverson also suggested that any defendant
show the plaintiff that it is not costless to sue. Thus a defendant should
counterclaim. Halverson bluntly suggested that private plaintiffs look at their
pocketbooks rather than the so-called "public interest," so defendants should make
plaintiffs worry about their pocketbooks. He also suggested that if more than one
private suit is filed, the defendant should get the weak suit to trial fIrst. ... [After]
the plaintiff's board of directors has seen months of attorneys' fees and corporate
disruption, the plaintiff's board will work in the defendant's favor and nudge its
lawyers toward a compromise. . .. In sum, he stated, settle strong cases and try the
weak cases, always while delaying the Government.
Frank Discussion of Antitrust Trial Tactics Provided at New England Conference (Dec. 7,
1976).
190. Both parties have a special incentive to settle cases that, if the plaintiff prevails,
would bankrupt the defendant.
191. Other factors could include lawyer or client stubbornness, irrationality, or denial
of the likely impending reality of the court's verdict. Another possibility is the unethical
resistance by counsel to accept a settlement that would be good for their clients, but would
generate fewer legal fees than litigation. This could be especially likely to occur in class
action cases because class members cannot effectively supervise their attorneys. It also is
possible that as a case develops, plaintiffs are more likely to settle to the extent that they come
to believe that their case's potential rewards are likely to be less than the expected payoff.
However, the costs of litigation are automatically recovered by prevailing plaintiffs. See 15
U.S.c. § 15(a) (2000). This factor is less important than in other fIelds. The extreme
example of a large ratio of attorneys' fees to recovery surely is that of United States Football
League v. National Football League, 887 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071
(1990). Although the plaintiff received only $1.00 before trebling, his attorneys received over
$5,000,000 in fees. Jd at 409.
192. One might believe, for example, that a settlement represents the lower bound on
the expected recovery if the case would go to trial (the present value of three times the
overcharge plus attorneys' fees) since a risk-neutral defendant would be unlikely to settle for
the entire expected verdict.
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extremely unreliable guide as to the size of the underlying cases'
overcharges. Settlements are by no means likely to be compromises
193
for half of the overcharges. Risk-averse plaintiffs with a strong case
might settle for very little if they need the money quickly and,
consequently, are in a weak bargaining position.1 94 Conversely, riskaverse defendants with a strong case might settle for what might seem
like an overly generous amount to avoid even a small probability that
an irrational judge or jury will award an amount large enough to
cripple the company.195 The authors have heard such a wide variety of
One might also believe the supposed rule of thumb that good antitrust cases usually
settle for single damages, perhaps on the dubious theory that the trebling (which produces a
higher number) and the lack of prejudgment interest (which produces a lower number) would
roughly usually cancel one another. We have no evidence as to whether this is the way that
plaintiffs, defendants, or their attorneys typically behave. We have, however, heard
trustworthy plaintiff's and defendant's attorneys tell us, anecdotally, that they have settled
"good" cartel cases for single damages.
193. If the plaintiff and the defendant each had, and knew that they had, a 50% chance
of winning, then the settlement might well be for 50% of the present value of the
automatically trebled overcharges. But this would not be true if the plaintiff's chance of
prevailing was not 50%, if one party was a better bargainer, or if either party was unduly
optimistic or pessimistic about their chances of prevailing. Suppose, for example, that
difficult class action certification problems reduced the plaintiff's chances of winning to
25%. Even if defendants really did raise prices by 30%, this often can be very difficult for
the plaintiff to prove. If the plaintiff only has a 25% chance of obtaining class certification
and subsequently proving the damages, a settlement should be at far below the level of 50%
of the discounted present value of three times the overcharges.
Moreover, publicly available settlements typically contain very little usable data. Often
they do not even include the size of the affected commerce, making the calculation of the
overcharge percentage highly speculative.
194. Plaintiffs' counsel typically asserts that defense counsel is able to fmd barely
ethical ways to delay meritorious claims for years. Since antitrust awards do not contain
prejudgment interest except in extraordinary circumstances that rarely occur, see 15 U.S.c.
§ 15(a), and plaintiffs often need the money in the short tenn, these delays hann plaintiffs'
bargaining position significantly. Plaintiffs' counsel also asserts that defendants often are
able to unreasonably prevent the necessary class certifications, and otherwise to make
litigation so burdensome that plaintiffs have to settle for only a small fraction of the actual
overcharges. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
195. The authors have heard variations on this theme many times. Attorneys for
defendants in cases that have settled for eight figures appear to believe, well after the cases
were over and after there was any threat of further liability, that their clients never affected
prices. Defendants' attorneys often assert that their clients (who were found by a court to
have agreed to fix prices) were prevented by market forces from affecting prices significantly.
However, rather than take the risk of having a judge or jury not believe them, they settle for a
large sum.
One of the authors of this article once worked for a client who went to jail for rigging
the bid for an extremely complex product. The author believes, after spending a considerable
time trying to detennine the relevant costs, that this client inadvertently fixed the price at too
Iowa level. Their intention was of course to bid higher than the competitive price (but not so
high as to attract suspicion). But the finn underestimated how costly the item was to make,
so apparently it actually lost money.
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claims from both plaintiffs and defendants l96 as to settlement
motivations l97 that we do not believe that analysis based upon average
198
settlements would be very meaningful.

A.

Sample and Results

We instead attempted to obtain the largest possible sample of
verdicts in collusion cases. We searched for final decisions in United
States antitrust cases involving horizontal collusion-broadly defined
to include bid-rigging and related practices-in which a judge, jury, or
commission calculated the damages. 199 We found cases by the use of
computer-assisted searches of data bases,2oo by searching through a
large number of articles and treatises on cartels and on antitrust
damages, and by asking groups of knowledgeable antitrust
professionals for any examples they knew of that might contain useful

Another factor that can make defendants want to settle even if they did not raise prices is
antitrust's joint and several liability doctrine, which makes every member of a cartel liable for
the overcharges of the entire cartel. See Denger, supra note 79, at 10. This can lead to
extremely large potential damages, and even a small risk of a huge payout can, from the
defendant's perspective, overshadow a weak liability case. The defendant might be forced to
settle for a significant amount even if it did not cause prices to be elevated.
196. Interestingly, defendants sometimes assert that unscrupulous plaintiff attorneys
often only have an interest in the size of their legal fees, rather than the amount they recover
for their clients. If true, this gives rise to the possibility that plaintiff attorneys, especially in
consumer class action cases, might settle for unduly low amounts solely to secure generous
legal fees for themselves. The courts are supposed to prevent this from happening, but judges
sometimes are too busy to do so optimally.
197. One of the most unusual settlement stories came from a very reliable defense
counsel who is among the most honest members of the bar. His client settled generously
despite winning numerous preliminary motions and discovering that the facts were
developing more and more favorably to its position. The client unexpectedly instructed
counsel to settle on any terms possible before the end of the calendar year. The company had
decided to change to a profit sharing arrangement for the following calendar year, and its
executives preferred to pay large damages before the end of the calendar year rather than risk
even a small probability of paying modest damages, and certain legal fees, the following
calendar year. Needless to say, the size of this settlement was unrelated to the actual
overcharges (which in this case probably did not exist).
198. We are not asserting that it would be impossible to derive insights from an
analysis of settlements. We only believe that it would be difficult. We could imagine, for
example, a study of settlements based upon candid interviews with the participants that could
yield a great deal of important information. Anonymous questionnaires about past cases are
another possible research method. See Salop & White, supra note 188, at 12.
199. We excluded cases that were overturned on appeal.
200. Computerized searches were not, with only a few exceptions, particularly helpful.
Most searches turned up hundreds of useless citations, including our searches for "pricefixing" or "bid-rigging" and "verdict;' "amount of overcharge;' "overcharge" and "percent,"
"auction" and "conspiracy" within "antitrust," "collusion," and "dollars" or "cents." We
never were able to design a successful focused computerized case search.
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information.201 We have included every qualifying final collusion
verdict we were able to find. However, many of the verdicts that we
did find were only expressed in dollar amounts which we were unable
to translate into percentages, so we reluctantly had to omit these
cases.202
The vast majority of the cases we found settled or were
disrnissed. 203 This left a disappointingly small sample size to analyze.
However, we know of no reason to believe that our sample is biased in
any particular direction. 204 Moreover, our sample of twenty-five
observations is roughly as large as the sample size of those in the prior
surveys that we reported in Table 1 (which were 5-7, 12, 12, 13, 22,
and 38 in number, respectively). Nevertheless, this sample is
disappointingly small compared to the number of economic
observations we were able to collect. Due to its small size, these
results should be interpreted with caution. They should be considered
only as additional data worthy of analysis and discussion, not as
definitive material.
The results of our survey of final verdicts in collusion cases are
that the twenty-five collusion episodes had a median average
overcharge of 21.6% and a mean average overcharge of 30.9%. The
nine cases that reported peak overcharges produce a median peak
overcharge of 71.4% and a mean peak overcharge of 167%. All but
five found that the cartel had raised prices by more than the
Commission's 10% benchmark. Due to the small number of final
verdicts, it would not be meaningful to analyze these verdicts in even
smaller groups205-i.e., we could only find eight final verdicts
20 I. For example, inquiries were made on the antitrust Iistserves of the ABA Antitrust
Section, the National Association of Attorneys General, and the American Antitrust Institute.
202. See, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390,
396 (1906); Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616, 621 (4th Cir. 1979);
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 150 F.2d 877, 882-84 (7th Cir. 1945), revll, 327 U.S.
251 (1946); Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. B.P. N. Am. Petroleum, 736 F. Supp. 511, 513
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
203. We surely found only a small percentage offmal verdicts, and would be grateful
if readers could inform us of final verdicts that we inadvertently omitted.
204. For a number of considerations, see the discussion infia Part Y.B.
205. In addition, it could be argued that one, or possibly two, of these cases involved
conduct that would be unlikely to be the subject of criminal fines. Federal Trade Commission
v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass 'n involved a horizontal conspiracy by legal aid attorneys
with an arguable political motivation to raise legal fees, by 16.7%. 493 U.S. 411, 415-18
(1990). Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc. involved a naked division of markets for bar review
courses that raised prices by 167%. 498 U.S. 46, 47 (1990) (per curiam). Neither case was
treated criminally. Omitting these cases would leave the survey's median unaffected, but
would lower its mean.
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involving bid-rigging episodes, so it does not seem worthwhile for this
Article separately to report the median or mean figures for bid-rigging
cartels.

B

Reliability and Possible Biases

How useful are the decisions of judges and juries in answering
the question of how high cartels raise prices? Their verdicts are, of
cuurse, based on the opinions of the competing expert witnesses, who
come to radically different conclusions about the size of the damages
involved. 2OO Both sides make their presentations and the finders of fact
decide which expert is more believable on particular issues (with the
plaintiff having the burden ofproot).207
This mayor may not be the best way to detennine which expert
witness's conclusions are more accurate since many skills besides facts
and economic reasoning can play a role in the judge or jury
determination. 208 While the common law system of jury and judge
verdicts is far from perfect, it is the system our nation has chosen to
use in a wide variety of life and death decisions affecting our society.209
Since the United States has long continued to use this system,210 our
nation has made an implicit decision that judges and juries are the best
way to arrive at the truth the largest percentage of the time. We know
of no way to prove whether judges or juries achieve results better than
those of the economists who publish studies in journals and books.
206. It is extremely unlikely that there has ever been even a single antitrust case where
experts for opposing sides agreed upon the amount of damages. Why do "neutral" experts
who work for plaintiffs always calculate significant larger amounts than do those who work
for defendants?
Similarly, although we find no evidence for the allegation, the economic studies
reported elsewhere in this Article are open to the charge that some of the authors' and their
methodology are biased.
207. Moreover, the likelihood and size of damages also will depend upon the absolute
and relative abilities of the defending and prosecuting counsel. We know of no evidence,
however, as to whether defendants or plaintiffs are likely to have the best legal representation
on average.
208. Author Connor has been an expert witness and author Lande has worked with
expert witnesses in antitrust cases. They have seen firsthand the truth of the conventional
wisdom that presentation skills can be as crucial as economic and factual knowledge.
209. While it may be true that some juries, and also trial or appellate judges, are not
objective, the burden of proof should be on those who would assert that the overall system,
including its appeals, has a systematic bias, or that an alternative approach to answering the
question of how high cartels raise prices would be superior.
210. In other nations with admirable judicial systems, judges or judicial panels are the
vehicles of decision-making in antitrust cases, which typically are civil matters. Se~ e.g.,
MARc VAN DER WOUDE & CHRISTOPHER JONES, EC COMPETITION LAW HANDBOOK 593-629
(2003) (discussing the approach of the EU).
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Neither sample is perfect-each has its strong and weak points. But
since the question of how high cartels raise prices is an important one
that deserves as reliable an answer as we can ascertain, we are using
this method as an additional one that deserves consideration. 2Il And,
since our two major approaches reinforce one another, the credibility
of both is strengthened.
Further, since such a large percentage of cases settle, one
reasonably might ask whether the few that do not settle are in some
manner different from those that do. Since the motivations for settling
and not settling are so varied, one can only speculate as to the biases
involved.
Are there likely to be any significant systematic differences
between cases that settle and those that do not? Is there reason to
believe that classes of cases for which settlement will be less likelysuch as in cases where the parties have different expectations as to
what the outcome is likely to be-when the overcharge percentage is
especially high? As examples we will present two contrasting
possibilities. First, it certainly is possible that for cases in which the
cartel overcharged by a large percentage the defendants might reason
that the plaintiff is likely to be able to prove at least some overcharges
to the fact finder's satisfaction. The defendant might be more likely to
settle these cases. 212 Alternatively, it could be true that a small
overcharge percentage-less than 5%--might be too small for the
plaintiff successfully to distinguish from purely random movements in
prices. If the plaintiffs believed that the defendant had increased the
price by 4%, but knew that it would be extremely difficult to prove
this, they would be less likely to sue.213 As these examples illustrate,
we can only speculate as to why a survey of verdicts could be biased in
either direction and could yield results that are higher or lower than the
actual mean or median cartel overcharge. While we certainly
acknowledge this method's potential flaws, we know of no reason to

211. We welcome a healthy debate over the significance of this Article's methods and
encourage other authors to fmd and employ alternate methods to ascertain cartel overcharges.
212. Some cases with large overcharges settle, while some smaller ones do go to trial.
213. Further, it might be less likely that a plaintiff would even file a civil case unless it
believed that damages were likely to be high. However, this Article examines overcharge
percentages, not total recoveries, and it focuses on medial percentages. Is it not true that
plaintiffs are likely to file cases with large expected total payoffs, regardless of what
overcharge percentage that constitutes? What difference does it make to plaintiffs or their
attorneys if they prove a I% overcharge on $1 billion in sales, 10% on $100 million, or 100%
on $10 million? In all three examples, the amount of the expected overcharge would be
identical.
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believe that it is either systematically biased or unreliable, or why this
unreliability would shift the results in a particular direction.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

Our survey identified about 200 serious social-science studies of
214
cartels which contained 674 observations of "average" overcharges.
215
Our primary finding is that the median cartel overcharge for all types
of cartels over all time periods has been 25%: 17-19% for domestic
cartels and 30-33% for international cartels. 216 Thus, in general,
international cartels have been about 75% more effective in raising
prices than domestic cartels.
Because the United States has
historically had by far the toughest system of anticartel sanctions, this
could imply that these sanctions have been having significant effects.
These cartel overcharges are skewed to the high side, pushing the
mean overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods to 49%.
These results are generally consistent with the few, more limited,
previously published works that survey cartel overcharges. The six
studies we thought exhibited the highest standards of scholarship
(Table 1) report samples with simple average median overcharges of
28% and simple average mean overcharges of 31 % of affected sales.
In our social-science sample, 79% of the overcharges were higher
than the 10% presumption contained in the Commission Gwdelines,
indeed 60% were above 20%. Perhaps surprisingly, bid-rigging was
no more injurious than other forms of collusion. If anything, our data
suggests that bid-rigging might be about one-fifth less injurious.
These results suggest that the Commission should amend its
Gwdelines, which currently treat bid-rigging more harshly than other
forms of collusion. Nor is there any empirical basis for the
Commission's statement that cartels are less dangerous when they are
formed in larger markets.

214. Average overcharges are those calculated from an entire cartel episode, not just a
peak or isolated result.
215. All figures presented in this part incorporate all relevant zero estimates and omit
peak results.
216. This study found results for 247 international cartel episodes and 198 domestic
cartel episodes. In addition, we found significant differences in average overcharges across
cartels by geographic type. Those managed in single European countries have the highest
median overcharges (43%), but curiously those organized across national boundaries in
Western Europe were as a group the least successful (16% median overcharge). North
American conspiracies also had quite low average overcharges (21 %). Median overcharges
for Asian-based and global conspiracies were relatively high (29%). See Connor, supm note
2, at 56, tbl. 10.
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For most types of cartels there have been modest downtrends in
cartel markups over time.217 In particular, it should be noted that since
1990, the average overcharges of discovered cartels fell to 25% for
international cartels.218 Moreover, the thirty post-1990 domestic
observations had a mean overcharge of 26% and a median overcharge
of 24%.219 Because the post-1990 era has been the period with by far
the highest level of fines imposed, these decreases are consistent with
the theory of optimal deterrence discussed in Part II.220 They also
suggest that the recent worldwide trend toward the intensification of
cartel penalties has been desirable. 221 If the worldwide system of
criminal fines can be made to correspond more closely to the actual
levels of cartel overcharges, sanctions against price-fixing will more
closely provide optimal deterrence.
The results of the survey of final verdicts in decided U.S.
collusion cases, only three of which were international cartels, show an
average median overcharge of 22% and an average mean overcharge of
31 %.222 Thus, the twenty-five decisions produce average overcharges
that are quite comparable to the results of the much larger set of
economic estimates. All but five of the reported decisions found that
the cartel had raised prices by more than the Commission's lO%

217. The fact that cartel overcharge estimates have not changed much over the past
century (except as noted above) provides a rough indication that progress in theories and
empirical methods has not totally invalidated cartel case studies published in the early years
of cartel scholarship. We also ascertained that median overcharges are not sensitive to
whether or not a study was subject to formal peer review. However, in an analysis of fmely
matched cartel episodes, we did find that econometric approaches typically produced lower
estimates than did application of the "before and after" method.
218. There were 137 international cartels analyzed for this period.
219. One estimate was a zero. Of the 30 observations, 10 were bid-rigging, with mean
and median overcharges of21.5% and 16.5%, respectively.
220. There has been a great deal of speculation about how price flxers behave and to
what signals they do or do not respond. We cannot in any meaningful way truly
psychoanalyze them and use these results to set up a system likely to provide them with
optimal incentives. Nevertheless, the data suggests that the relevant corporate officials do
respond to the incentives that have been created by the existing system of criminal penalties.
This suggests that the current system of cartel fmes has been a very successful program, and
that for the flrst time in history they are large enough that they have started to have a
signiflcant effect on corporate behavior.
221. In the United States alone, cartel fmes totaled $175 million in 1955-1988, $340
million in 1989-1997, and more than $1.8 billion in 1998-2002. These data are expressed in
2002 U.S. dollars. The increase in the European Union is even more dramatic. See Connor,
supra note 41, at 239.
222. In addition, the nine cases that reported peak overcharges produce a median peak
overcharge of 71.4% and a mean peak overcharge of 130%.
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benchmark. Because of the relatively small number of verdicts,223
however, we think it improper to place much weight on subgroups of
these data, such as cartels formed since 1990 or bid-rigging cartels.224
This Article's Introduction noted that there is a view among some
antitrust writers that there is little evidence that cartels raise prices
significantly for a period long enough to justify extant anticartel laws
and, especially, extant cartel penalties. Consequently, they argue for
the repeal or scaling back of the fines or damages that result from
collusion. Even some who recognize that a significant number of
cartels are harmful believe that the Commission's presumption that
cartels raise prices by 10% is too large. Our results, which are based
upon an extraordinarily large amount of data spanning a broad swath
of history of all types of private cartels, sharply contradict these views.
In fact, the data suggest the opposite. Median overcharges are, in
fact, two or three times as high as the level presumed by the
Commission.
Moreover, the great majority of the overcharge
estimates-those with overcharges above 20%--have a mean
overcharge of 75%, more than seven times the Guideline5
presumption. Base fines of 20% of carte lists ' affected commerce,
even when adjusted by significant culpability multipliers,225 will do
little to deter most of these cartels.
The Guideline5 10% overcharge presumption was, moreover,
based upon the estimate that "the average gain from price-fixing is 10
percent of the selling price."226 The Guideline5 "average" is the
equivalent of our mean, not our median. 227 The correct comparisons
are, therefore, not between the Gwdeline5 figure of 10% and our
medians of 25% for the economic studies and 22% for the case
verdicts. Rather, the truer comparison would be to our mean figures of
49% and 31 %, respectively. We are agnostic on the question of
whether, from the perspective of optimal deterrence, mean or median
223. However, the other overcharge studies that we reported in Table 1, supra, had
samples of 5-7, 12, 12, 13, 22, and 38 estimates, respectively. Our legal sample of 23 fits
comfortably with these in terms of sample size.
224. For example, we could only find eight reported verdicts that involved bid-rigging,
so it does not seem worthwhile for this article to report the median or mean figures for bidrigging verdicts.
225. For a variety of factors, however, very few firms actually pay a fine amounting to
20% of the amount of commerce affected. Most violators have their fines reduced for a
variety of reasons. See Spratling, supra note 32, at 801-07.
226. USSG MANuAL, supmnote 49, § 2Rl.l, application n.3.
227. The inclusion of a few highly successful cartels in a sample implies that the
sample's mean is significantly higher than its median. The mean will also be higher than the
median because overcharges cannot be less than zero.
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figures should be used as the basis of the Commission's presumption.
We simply note that our decision to focus on the median figures has
been a conservative one.
There is another respect in which this Article has been
conservative. We have focused solely on the public injury that arises
from the transfer of income or wealth from purchasers to the cartel. As
noted in Part I, cartels also can lead to allocative inefficiency, umbrella
effects, less innovation, managerial slack, and nonprice harms to
quality and variety, among other thingS.228 Yet, we have not taken these
harms into account. Nor have we adjusted our results for inflation.229
Admittedly, many or most of these factors are extremely difficult to
measure, especially in a litigation context. While the GUlde1ines seem
to have doubled the 10% presumption to account for its omission of
these factors,23o we believe that this doubling has also been
conservative.
For these reasons, if the Commission decides to reexamine
whether 10% is the right overcharge presumption, it should consider
raising the presumption to 15% for domestic cartels and 25% for
international cartels. 231 This is a conservative and modest proposal in
light of this Article's demonstration that cartels typically generate at
least two or three times the harms presumed by the current Sentencing

GUldelines.
Before the recent decision in Umted States v. Booker,232 however,
a jury determined whether a violation occurred, and the sentencing
judge determined the volume of commerce affected by the violation to
a preponderance of the evidence standard. Then, using the Sentencing
Guidelines, the judge relied on the Commission's presumption that the
defendant raised prices by 10% of the volume of affected commerce,
doubled this figure,m and used a complex formula to adjust this
amount. 234 If the fine would have exceeded the statutory maximum of
228. See supra Part II.
229. Suppose a cartel overcharges in years one through seven, followed by discovery
and another three years of litigation. The penalties would be assessed in year ten. The
overcharges from year one really should be adjusted for nine to ten years of inflation, but we
have not done this. This omission means that our penalty recommendations are too low.
230. See supra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
231. If the policymakers decide that it would be unwise to make this differentiation,
however, a 20% overall presumption would be appropriate.
232. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
233. SeeUSSG MANuAL, supra note 49, § 2RI.I, application n.3.
234. Some of the adjustment factors, such as whether defendant was the organizer or
leader or a cartel, increased the fme level. See USSG MANUAL, supra note 49, § 2R1.I,
application n.l.
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$100 million,235 the enforcers would have had to rely on the alternative
sentencing provision of "twice-the-gain or twice-the-Ioss."236
After Booker, the government will have to prove to a jury the
amount of commerce involved beyond a reasonable doubt. 237 This
should not, however, prove to be a significant additional burden. 238
Thus, most cases involving potential fines of less than $100 million
should not be significantly39 affected by Booker, except insofar as the
Gwdelinei criteria will be advisory instead of mandatory (and even
this might not make much difference in practice).24o
For the largest cartels, however, Booker could have a significant
impact because "twice-the-gain or twice-the-Ioss" will now have to be
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Due to the nature of
antitrust damages, this should prove a truly formidable task.24 I
However, the Department of Justice could attempt to circumvent the

23S. In 2004, the maximum was increased from a $10 million to $100 million for
corporations, and from $3S0,000 to $1 million for individuals. Antitrust Criminal Penalty
Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 21S, 118 Stat. 66S, 668 (to be
codified at IS U.S.c. § 430 I).
236. See 18 U.S.c. § 3S71(d) (2000). In practice, however, every case in which the
fme exceeded the statutory maximum settled. By choosing to settle, defendants made a
calculated decision not to take the risk that the government would be able to prove an
extremely large fine under the "twice-the-gain" or "twice-the-Ioss" standard, and instead
settled for a significantly lower amount. For a discussion, see Tara L. Reinhart et aI., The
Business ofSentencing: Facing the Facts After Blakely, Booker, andFanfan, THE ANTITRUST
SOURCE, Jan. 200S, available at http://www.abanet.org!antitrust!source/OI-OS/janOSjull_
source.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST SOURCE].
237. Booker, 12S S. Ct. at 738-42.
238. Nor should it be unduly difficult for the government to prove whether the
defendant was a leader or organizer of the cartel, or the other factors that would lead to
increases in the fine. See USSG MANUAL, supm note 49, § 2Rl.1, application n.!.
239. For additional effects, see Reinhart et aI., supmnote 236, at 7-9.
240. See Gary Fields & Laurie P. Cohen, Judges Maintain Sentence Fonnula Despite
Ruling, WALL ST. 1., Feb. 11, 200S, at AS. The Chair of the Federal Sentencing Commission
testified before a House Subcommittee that preliminary data, involving 692 cases, shows that
virtually the same percentage of sentences in post-Booker cases as in pre-Booker cases were
within the Sentencing Guidelines' ranges. ld
241. Knowing the great difficulty the government would face if the case went to court,
defendants should demand lower fmes when they are plea bargaining. In addition, some
defendants might now be less likely to reach plea agreements and more likely to take their
chances in court. A jury would decide the "twice-the-gain or twice-the-loss" issue largely on
the basis of testimony from economic experts, who would have to convincingly analyze huge
amounts of complicated data about market events and price trends and levels. It would be
extremely difficult for a government expert to convince a jury that prices rose a particular
amount "beyond a reasonable doubt," particularly since the defendant would have an equally
qualified expert testifYing in its favor.
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virtual $100 million de facto "cap" on fines 242 by returning to its
former practice of splitting antitrust charges into multiple counts, by
product or geographic market, for what could be argued to be the
"same" cartel,243 and by also charging multiple counts of mail fraud,244
wire fraud,24S or RICO violations for what essentially are antitrust
246
offenses.
By doing this the Department can attempt to effectively increase
the antitrust fines involving the largest cartels in a manner more likely
to lead to the optimal deterrence of antitrust offenses.

242. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. Moreover, in response to Booker,
Congress might well pass legislation to preserve as much of the Sentencing Guidelines as is
constitutionally pennissible or to increase the maximum fine under the Sherman Act.
243. For example, in United States v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., which involved
an international fertilizer nitrogen cartel, the DO] successfully charged the same defendants
with eleven separate Sherman Act violations. 42 F. Supp. 425, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Many
of the largest cartels have involved multiple products. See, e.g., Connor, supra note 40, at
277-337 (analyzing the many products at issue in the international vitamin cartel case).
244. See United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maint. Co., 598 F.2d I !OI, 1103 (7th Cir.
1979).
245. See United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232, 233 (6th Cir. 1990).
246. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 636 (D.
Alaska 1982).
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APPENDIX: FINAL JUDGMENTS IN COLLUSION CASES
Name and Type of Case
1.

2.

Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 US.
211 (1899) (conspiring to allocate customers via secret
bidding pool, and the court provided a typical result, but
247
not an average figure)
Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206 (8th
Cir. 1967) (involving highway construction bidding
8
conspiracy
Armco Steel Corp. v. Adams County, 376 F.2d 212 (8th
Cir. 1967) (involving highway construction bidding
conspiracy, with the same defendants as previous case
but different victims)
Colorado ex reI Woodard v. Goodell Bros., Inc.,
CivANo. 84-A-803, 1987WL 6771 (D. Colo. Feb. 17,
1987)249

t

3.

4.

5.

FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 US. 411
(1990) (involving legal aid attorneys who conspired to
raise fees)250

247.

Overcharge
Peak %
Average %
34.7-42.6

18.5

17.3-20.3

9.6

251
16.7

75

175 US. 211, 212 (1899).

The cost of producing pipe at Chattanooga, together with a reasonable profit, did
not exceed $15 a ton. It could have been delivered at Atlanta at $17 to $18 a ton,
and yet the lowest price which that foundry was permitted by the rules of the
association to bid was $24.25. The same thing was true all through ''pay'' territory
to a greater or less degree, and especially at "reserved" cities.

Id at 238. This means that the typical price increase was at least $24.25 - 18
34.7%. And, 24.25 - 17 = $7.25117 = 42.6%.
248. 376 F.2d 206, 208 (8th Cir. 1967).

= 6.25/18 =

We have no difficulty whatever in holding that there was adequate basis ...
for the jury to determine and fmd ... proximate injury in the amount of $258,355,
on the extent of the artificiality involved in the fixed prices and its ingrediency in
the $1,396,500 list-price aggregate ... which had entered into the construction
projects let during the conspiracy period, and in the $2,000 quantity of direct
purchases made by the State.

Id at 211-12. If $258,355 of the $1,396,500 was an overcharge, then the overcharge would
have been 22.7% of the base figure of$I,138,145.
249. The court found that the plaintiff had reliably proved the overcharges on two of
the three contracts at issue; competitive prices of $333,253 and $343,051 were increased by
$35,381 and $29,732. CivA No.84-A-803, 1987 WL 6771, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 1987).
250. 493 US. 411, 414 (1990).
Legal aid attorney conspired to raise fees.
Cartellboycott by Washington D.c. lawyers (public defenders) who demanded (and received)
a price increase from thirty dollars per hour court time and twenty dollars per hour noncourt
time to $35 per hour for both in the span of a week. Id at 414-18. They would later seek and
obtain a price increase to fifty-five dollars per hour court time and forty-five dollars per hour
noncourt time (without a boycott). Id at 418.
251. The increase was 16.7% for in-court time and 75% for out-of-court time, but it
was not possible to compute the average.
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Average %
Peak %

Freeman v. S.D. Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133 (9th
Cir. 2003) (involving conspiracy to standardize
. . charges)252
subscnptIon

Greenhaw v. Lubbock County Beverage Ass'n, 721 F.2d
1019 (5th Cir. 1983) (conspiracy to fIX retail price of
53
liquor for 4 112 years/
8. Homewood Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 110 F. Supp.
398 (D. Minn. 1952) (involving fIrst run fIlms
)254
.
conspiracy
9. Kruman v. Christie's Int'l, 284 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir.
2002) (involving fme art auction cartel)255
10. New York v. Hendrickson Bros., 840 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir.
1988) (involving three distinct episodes of bid-rigging on
state construction contracts)256

150

7.

7.74

6.3
50

150

49.2
32.1
13.6

252. 322 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2003). A group of realtor associations combined
and standardized their charges. Id at 1141-42. Some raised SUbscription price from ten
dollars up to twenty-five dollars, others lowered them. Id at 1141. Although it was not a
simple price-fIXing conspiracy, Judge Kozinski called it "price-fIxing." Id at 1144.
However, since he did not state how much the average charge increased, we did not include it
in our median or average estimates.
253. 721 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1983). The jury decided amount of overcharge and
the appellate court upheld that detennination. Id at 1026, 1033.
254. 110 F. Supp. 398,416,418 (D. Minn. 1952). The case involved a $39,432.67 loss
on sales of$625,763.78. Id
255. 284 F.3d 384, 389 (2d Cir. 2002).
On November 2, 1992, Sotheby's armounced it would increase its buyer's
premiums from 10% to 15% for the first $50,000.00 of the purchase price. On
December 22, 1992, Christie's declared an identical increase in its buyer's
premiums. The defendants allegedly agreed not to reduce these premiums.
The defendants also agreed to set their seller's commissions at identical
levels. Prior to March 1995, the defendants would pennit clients to negotiate
smaller seller's commissions. On or about March 10, 1995, Christie's announced it
would implement a fIXed schedule of non-negotiable seller's commissions ranging
between 2% and 10% depending on the value of the item to be sold. On April 13,
1995, Sotheby's stated it would implement a fixed schedule of non-negotiable
seller's commissions substantially identical to the schedule set by Christie's.
Id at 390. For the items covered by the agreement, buyer's commissions rose by 50%, from
10% to 15%. Jd In addition, the new seller's commissions means that total commissions had
increased from 10% up to as much as 25% - a 150% increase. Id
256. 840 F.2d 1065, 1069 (2d Cir. 1988). The jury detennined that contract
overcharges were $590,000 on what should have been a $1.2 million contract (49.2%),
$644,000 on what should have been a $2,004,000 contract (32.1 %), and $1,113,000 on what
should have been a $8,187,000 contract (13.6%). Jd at 1070-72. The court also noted:
Amfar was advised not to "get too greedy," i.e., it was to limit the excess profIt
included in its bid to 20-25% and was not to seek excess profits of 40-50%. Later
review by Ambrosio of bids submitted by other co-conspirators led him to the
conclusion that most of them were submitting bids that included excess profits
higher than the 20-25% benchmark.
Id at 1070.
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II. New York v. Cedar Park Concrete Corp., No. 85 ClY
1887,1997 WL 306909 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21,1997)
(involving construction bid-rigging during 7 year
. d)257
peno
12. N. Tex. Producers Ass'n v. Young, 308 F. 2d. 235 (5th Cir.
1962) (involving conspiracy to exclude low cost milk
58
sellerl
13. Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp.
914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (involving electrical equipment
manufacturing price-fixing conspiracy)259
14. Palmerv. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990)
(involving naked division of market for bar review
courses)260
15. Pease v. Jasper Wyman & Son, 845 A.2d 552 (Me. 2004)
(involving conspiracy to suppress prices paid for wild
l
blueberriest

567

Overcharge
Peak %
Average %
6

36

10.9

167

21.6

32.8

262

Most of the economic analyses we surveyed would have called these different episodes
and analyzed them separately, even though legally they were treated together. This clearly is a
judgment call upon which reasonable people could differ. If they were treated as one larger
conspiracy, the overcharges would total $2,347,000 on a base of $11,391,000, or 20.6%
overall. Alternatively the average of the three computed overcharges is 31.6%. In addition,
the court found that a subcontract that should have been bid at $512,000 was given to a fellow
conspirator, in return for not bidding, for an additional $338,000, a 66% overcharge. Jd This
was not included as a separate overcharge figure, however, since is subsumed in the
conspiracy for its prime contract.
257. No. 85 CIV 1887, 1997 WL 306909, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1997). The
conspiracy was organized personally by Paul Castellano, on behalf of "the governing body of
New York's five organized crime families." Jd Yet the court only found that it raised prices
by 6% (Overcharge of $1,506,000, divided by the competitive price of ($26,581,000$1,506,000) = 6%.). Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 24-25, New York v. Cedar
Park Concrete Corp., No. 85 CIV 1887, 1997 WL 306909 (S.D.N. Y. Oct. II, 2000).
258. 308 F.2d 235, 237 (5th Cir. 1962). This involved a horizontal conspiracy to
exclude a low-priced milk seller that would have sold milk for sixty-nine cents instead of
ninety-six cents. Id He was awarded $100,000 in lost profit damages for the period at
issues. Jd The important point for our study, however, is the court's conclusion that that the
horizontal competitors caused the price of the milk that plaintiff would have sold to
consumers at sixty-nine cents to be sold to them at ninety-six cents instead. Jd The
conspiracy prevented a 36% price drop. Id
259. 244 F. Supp. 914, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). "This overcharge of $5,624,401 is
slightly under eleven per cent of the total fmal order price for all units ($52,027,785) and
slightly under ten per cent of the total final billed price, including escalation ($57,116,819)."
Jd at 947. This totals 10.92% of the precollusive amount.
260. 498 U.S. 46,47 (1990). This case involved an agreement by the only two bar
review preparation companies in Georgia. Jd They entered into a naked division of markets,
after which the price of a bar review course in Georgia went from $150 to "over $400." Id
We will conservatively assume that the price only went up to $400, an increase of 167%.
261. 845 A.2d 552, 553 (Me. 2004). This was a four-year average, calculated from
Solow exhibit 10, "Underpayment to Growers;' whose figures were accepted by the jury. A
$56 million judgment was upheld. Id at 556.
262. For the year 1997.
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Name and Type of Case
16. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U.S. 555 (1931) (involving conspiracy to
monopolize and destroy plaintiff's business)263
17. Strobl v. N. Y. Mercantile Exch., 582 F. Supp. 770
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (involving conspiracy to lower the
price of potato futures)264
18. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561
(10th Cir. 1961) (involving 1938-48 conspiracy to reduce
.
pnces
pal'd fior vanad'lum ore)265
19. United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231
(N.M. 1980) (involving uranium cartel)266
20. United States v. Anderson, 326 F.3d 1319 (II th Cir.
67
2003) (involving bid-rigging on USAID contract/
21. United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000)
(involving conspiracy to raise lysine prices)268
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Overcharge
Average %
Peak %
27.7

48.6

22.5

38-47.5
567

16.4-39.2
71.4

263. 282 U.S. 555, 559 (1931). The jury awarded $65,000, before trebling. Id The
plaintiff had alleged that defendant reduced the value of property that cost $235,000 to only
$75,000. Id at 567. Therefore, damages must have been 65/235, or 27.7%.
264.
The $460,000 figure reached by the jury, therefore, was the equivalent of a finding
that the price of the May potato futures contract would have been approximately
$18.00, instead of $9.25, had the market been operating solely on the basis of
supply and demand....
. . . The jury could have concluded from the evidence of low supply that the
price of Maine potato futures was artificially low during the conspiracy period.
582 F. Supp. 770, 779 (S.D.N. Y. 1984). Price, therefore, was depressed 48.6%.
265. 300 F.2d 561, 573 (10th Cir. 1961). "In these circumstances, we cannot say that
the jury's finding to the effect that the free market price of 2 percent vanadium ore for the
period October 1938 through March 1948 was 40¢ per pound instead of 31 ¢ was clearly
erroneous." Id at 580.
266. 629 P.2d 231, 239, 242 (N.M. 1980). "Fourth, between 1972, when the cartel
apparently began, and 1975, when this suit was filed, the price of uranium in the United
States increased from approximately $6.00 per pound to approximately $40.00 per pound."
Id The court concluded that the price of uranium had increased by 566% during the period
of the conspiracy but did not say that all of this increase was due to the activity of the cartel.
See ld For this reason, this cartel's increase has been put in the maximum column, not the
average column.
267. 326 F.2d 1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003). Exhibits 16 and 24 say that the winning
bids on the three contracts at issue were $283.984 million. In the Transcript of Sentencing
Before the Honorable Robert B. Propst, May 20,2002, 77 (No. CR-OI-PT-0302-S), the judge
found that the total overcharges for these three contracts were "greater than 40 and less than
80" million dollars. Using the $40 million loss figure-this would mean that the three jobs
together should have cost $244 million, so 40/244 is 16.4%. For the higher overcharge
finding, the contracts should have totaled $204 million, so 80/204 = 39.2%.
268. 216 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2000).
The meeting ended without a sales volume allocation agreement, but two months
later, at the recommendation of Whitacre, the cartel raised prices anyway, and
prices rose from $.70 to $1.05 per pound ....
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22. United States v. Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d 1559 (11th
Cir. 1988) (involving bid-rigging on public works
. )269
project
23. United States v. Foley, 598 F. 2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979)
(involving real estate companies which agreed to raise
their commissions on houses)27o
24. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, Animal Science v.
Chinook Group, Ltd. No. 99-197 (TFR), 2003 WL
22114272 (D.D.e. Sept. 11,2003) (involving choline
chloride cartel jury verdict)271
25. Wall Prods. Co. v. Nafl Gypsum Co., 357 F. Supp. 832
(N.D. Cal. 1973) (involving conspiracy over price of
272
gypsum wallboard)
26. Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Ass 'n,568 F.2d 670 (10th Cir.
1977) (involving conspiracy by tour brokers to deny
73
plaintiffs entry into tour broker business/
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Peak %
AverllKe%
34

16.7

16.7

61

27

5

... [Much later] [t]he producers also agreed on a new price of $1.20 for the
United States market.
Id at 652-53. The court inferred that at least one sale took place at $1.20, so its maximum
increase was (1.20-.70)/.70 = 71.4%. See id at 653. As is typical, this court was not
perfectly clear as to what caused the price to rise. But the plain meaning of the quotation is
that the court found that, as a maximum, the cartel raised the price of Lysine by 71.4%. In
fact, this would be a modest conclusion because the court also wrote: "Together, the three
parent companies produced all of the world's lysine until the 1990s, presenting an obvious
opportunity for collusive behavior. Indeed the Asian cartel periodically agreed to fix prices,
which at times reached as high as $3.00 per pound." Id at 651. This would mean that the
maximum increase was roughly (3.00-.70)/.70 = 329%.
269. 859 F.2d 1559, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1998). The defendant made a $1.7 million
profit on a $5 million contract-a margin of34%.
270. 598 F.2d 1323, 1327 (4th Cir. 1979). On September 5, 1975, competing real
estate executives agreed to raise their commission from 6% to 7%. Id "Within the following
months each of the corporate defendants substantially adopted a seven percent commission
rate." Id Since almost all, but not 100%, of the sales were at a 7% commission, 16.7%
actually overstates the average actual rise somewhat.
271. The jury verdict was $49.54 million "before trebling and credit for prior
settlements." The plaintiff's expert listed the total sales by the defendants at $130.85 million,
an amount that the jury appeared to accept. This means that the jury verdict reflected
overcharges (before trebling) at 38% of sales. Class Plaintiff's Memorandum of Support to
Their Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement Between Class Plaintiffs and
Defendants Mitsui & Co., Ltd., Mitsui & Co. (USA), Inc., and Bioproducts, Inc. at 6, Animal
Sciences, Inc. v. Chinook Group, Ltd., 2003 WL 22114272 (D.D.C. Oct. 14,2003).
272. 357 F. Supp. 832, 834 (ND. Cal. 1973). Defendants conspired among
themselves and with others, to stabilize and maintain the price level of gypsum wallboard.
273. 568 F.2d 670, 672, 676-77 (10th Cir. 1977).
They had been able to obtain the same transportation service for 70 cents per mile
from the other licensed brokers. However, with Greyhound they were obliged to
pay a Special Operations Bus Order tariff of three and one-half cents per person
per mile. Of the eleven tours operated they had to pay this higher rate for eight
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toUTS. Plaintiffs calculated that they suffered a total loss of $10,165 as a result of
having to pay the higher tariff for the toUTS that they took.
Jd at 676-77. 3.5 divided by 70 equals 5%.

